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The Constitutional Law
of Agenda Control
Aziz Z. Huq
Constitutional scholarship is preoccupied with questions of how
state power should be constrained. The Constitution, however, not
only sets the bounds of state action, it also structures the range of
policy options officials may consider in the first instance and the
rules that organize how these options are transformed into legally
effective choices. This Article analyzes the ensuing constitutional law
of agenda control, focusing on the distribution of such powers
between the three federal branches. This analysis generates two
central claims. First, in order to calibrate intragovernmental
relations, the Framers incorporated an array of heterogeneous
agenda-control instruments across the three branches of government.
These rules make up a hitherto underappreciated constitutional law
of agenda control. Second, political actors have ignored or even
circumvented a surprising number of these constitutional agendacontrol rules. They instead have tended to negotiate alternate
distributions of agenda-control power at odds with the original
constitutional design. While the ensuing transformation of the
constitutional processes for governance has ambiguous distributive
consequences, the historical transformation of new law control is, on
balance, a desirable development.
Introduction .................................................................................................. 1402
I. Agenda Control as an Object of Constitutional Design............................. 1408
A. The Circumstances of Democratic Choice ................................ 1408
B. Agenda Control as an Equilibrating Device in the

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.15779/Z38WV96
Copyright © 2016 California Law Review, Inc. California Law Review, Inc. (CLR) is a
California nonprofit corporation. CLR and the authors are solely responsible for the content of their
publications.
 Frank and Bernice J. Greenberg Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School.
Thanks to Kent Barnett, Saul Levmore, and Nick Stephanopoulos for helpful conversations and
comments, and to Jerome Pierce, Alejandro Barrientos, and the other editors at the California Law
Review for their assiduous and careful work. All errors are mine alone. I am also pleased to
acknowledge the support of the Frank Cicero, Jr. Faculty Fund.

1401

1402

CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 104:1401

Context of Collective Choice ..................................................... 1410
1. Instability and Incoherence in Collective Choice ................ 1411
2. Institutional Responses to Instability in Collective Choice:
Agenda Control and Strategic Voting .................................. 1415
II. Agenda-Control Instruments in Constitutional Law ................................ 1418
A. A Definition of Agenda Control ................................................ 1418
B. Agenda Control and Congress ................................................... 1420
1. Bicameralism and Presentment ............................................ 1421
2. Bespoke Starting Rules for Legislation ............................... 1424
3. The Equilibrating Role of Political Parties .......................... 1425
C. Agenda Control and the Executive Branch ................................ 1428
1. Starting Rules and the Executive ......................................... 1428
2. Appointments as a Form of Agenda Control ....................... 1430
3. The Design of Federal Agencies .......................................... 1431
D. Agenda Control and the Judiciary.............................................. 1433
1. Jurisdictional Calibration as Agenda Control ...................... 1434
2. Justiciability Doctrine as Agenda Control ........................... 1436
E. Taxonomy of Agenda-Control Instruments in the Constitution 1438
III. The Transformation of Constitutional Agenda Control .......................... 1443
A. The Struggle for Agenda Control Between Congress
and the Executive ....................................................................... 1444
1. Congress and the Nation’s Regulatory Agenda ................... 1444
2. Congress and the Fiscal Agenda .......................................... 1448
3. The Presidential Veto Override ........................................... 1450
4. Judicial Efforts to Buttress Congressional Agenda Control 1451
B. The Struggle for Agenda Control Between Congress and the
Court .......................................................................................... 1452
C. Evaluating the Transformation of Constitutional
Agenda Control .......................................................................... 1456
Conclusion .................................................................................................... 1461

INTRODUCTION
The ordinary diet of constitutional adjudication is dominated by questions
about state actors’ powers. Can Congress, the Justices ask, regulate certain
private conduct1 or direct the President’s diplomatic decisions?2 What sort of

1. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2643 (2012). For a more recent
reaffirmation of the principle of limited enumerated powers, see Oneok, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 135 S. Ct.
1591, 1603 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“[T]o be ‘made in Pursuance’ of the Constitution, a law
must fall within one of Congress’ enumerated powers and be promulgated in accordance with the
lawmaking procedures set forth in that document.”).
2. See Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2084 (2015) (invalidating congressional
regulation of U.S. passports’ content as inconsistent with a presidential “recognition power”).
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cases must Article III forums decide?3 When can the President make recess
appointments4 or preempt a state’s procedural rules in the national interest?5
The resulting constitutional jurisprudence limits the government’s ability to act.
American constitutional law comprises a compendium of constraints upon state
power.
This story is incomplete. There is more to constitutional design than
jealous titration of state power via prohibitory injunctions. This Article
investigates an unexplored domain of constitutional design—the constitutional
law of agenda control.6 Its central premise is that constitutional rules do not
merely prohibit state action but also shape how decisions are made. For
example, the Court’s judgment in Zivotofsky v. Kerry is superficially a decision
about whether the President or Congress determines what gets printed in U.S.
passports.7 More profoundly, however, it is about which branch of government
sets the nation’s foreign policy agenda. Similarly, NLRB v. Canning most
directly concerns the President’s recess appointment authority, but it also
allocates power to both initiate and block regulatory agendas between the
branches.8 Agenda control in the federal courts is also a matter of explicit
disagreement. The dissenters in Obergefell v. Hodges perceived an improper
effort by “five unelected Justices” to foist “their personal vision of liberty upon
the American people.”9 In contemporaneous cases, though, those same
dissenters have invited other litigants to raise previously dormant constitutional
challenges—in effect seeking to shape the Court’s agenda in ways that are hard
to disentangle from a “personal vision” of the Constitution.10
I advance here two main claims about agenda-control rules. First, one of
the Constitution’s original functions was to structure how state actors selected

3. Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1942–44 (2015) (allowing
consent-based adjudication of certain state-law claims in bankruptcy court); see also Stern v. Marshall,
564 U.S. 462, 469 (2011) (holding that Article III limits non–Article III delegations).
4. NLRB v. Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2557 (2014).
5. Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 522–23 (2008) (holding that the President lacks authority
to delay Texas executions based on an International Court of Justice judgment).
6. I use the terms “agenda control” and “agenda setting” interchangeably in this Article.
7. 135 S. Ct. at 2084.
8. 134 S. Ct. at 2550.
9. 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2640 (2015) (Alito, J., dissenting); see id. at 2629 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(accusing the Obergefell majority of staking “a naked judicial claim to legislative—indeed, superlegislative—power; a claim fundamentally at odds with our system of government”).
10. In particular, Justice Thomas issued a series of striking concurrences in the 2014 Term that
flagged previously dormant constitutional issues in ways that invited litigants to file future challenges.
See Oneok, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1591, 1603 (2015) (noting “doubts about the legitimacy of
this Court’s precedents concerning the pre-emptive scope of the Natural Gas Act,” and in effect
flagging the issue for future challenge); Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.R.s, 135 S. Ct. 1225,
1240–41 (2015) (calling into question the permissible scope of legislative guidance and purporting to
“identify principles relevant to today’s dispute, with an eye to offering guidance to the lower courts on
remand”); Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1213 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(calling into question “the legitimacy of our precedents requiring deference to administrative
interpretations of regulations,” including Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410 (1945)).
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among issues and potential policy responses. The ensuing legal structures for
agenda control are distinct from more familiar constitutional limitations on
state action, yet they still shape the epistemic and strategic environment of
democratic governance. Second, the Framers’ original allocation of agendasetting power has not fared well (something that perhaps explains its relative
neglect among scholars). Interbranch negotiation and bargaining has led to
some agenda-control rules being ignored, even as others are circumvented. As
a result, the distribution of agenda-control power between various state
institutions has drifted far from the arrangement envisaged in 1787.
Let me unpack each of these points in turn. My first task, given the scant
academic attention paid to agenda-control rules,11 is descriptive and
conceptual. Constitutional scholars need a vocabulary to discuss the large
domain of agenda-control rules. To that end, I map out the agenda-control rules
found in the constitutional text. I identify three margins along which agendacontrol rules in the Constitution vary. First, rules can regulate either the
starting point of a decision-making process or, alternatively, require a
subsequent concurrence by a given institution. Second, agenda-control rules
can be intramural—in the sense of assigning power over a decision to the same

11. A few legal scholars have identified piecemeal some of the agenda-control instruments
discussed here. For example, Saul Levmore has offered an influential account of bicameralism as a
solution to incoherence in collective choice and an important analysis of the interaction between
interest-group activity and agenda-control instruments. See Saul Levmore, Voting Paradoxes and
Interest Groups, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 259, 261 (1999) (identifying a “link between instability and
[interest group] activity” such that interest groups “will then invest in order to influence . . . procedural
rules or, what is sometimes the same thing, the agenda setter”). William Eskridge and John Ferejohn
have drawn attention to the way in which lawmaking is “dynamic interaction between the preferences
of the House and Senate (bicameralism) and the President (presentment).” William N. Eskridge, Jr. &
John Ferejohn, The Article I, Section 7 Game, 80 GEO. L.J. 523, 527 (1992). In subsequent work,
Eskridge has extended the analysis to congressional committees. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Vetogates,
Chevron, Preemption, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1441, 1444–48 (2008) (describing opportunities for
House or Senate members to derail proposed legislation at “veto-gates,” i.e., necessary stages in the
legislative process where one group or another has the ability to derail a bill). They build on a political
science literature on “veto-gates”—a kind of concurrence power, in my argot—upon the available
range of policy outcomes. See George Tsebelis, Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in
Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism and Multipartyism, 25 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 289, 293
(1995). The Eskridge-Ferejohn analysis usefully draws attention to how the strategic invocation of
sequential veto-gates shapes the selection of proposals initially introduced into the lawmaking process,
an insight I extend here. See, e.g., Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra, at 531 (noting that “the threat of a veto
significantly affects the location of statutory policy”). Finally, there is a small literature on the
Origination Clause of Article I, Section 7. Rebecca M. Kysar, The ‘Shell Bill’ Game: Avoidance and
the Origination Clause, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 659 (2014) [hereinafter Kysar, Shell Bill] (offering
normative proposals to revive the efficacy of the Origination Clause); Rebecca M. Kysar, On the
Constitutionality of Tax Treaties, 38 YALE J. INT’L L. 1 (2013) (criticizing tax treaties on Origination
Clause grounds); Adrian Vermeule, The Constitutional Law of Congressional Procedure, 71 U. CHI.
L. REV. 361, 424–25 (2004) (analyzing effect of the Origination Clause). This Article draws on all
these previous analyses, but its aim is more synoptic than these precursors. Rather than exploring one
retail element of the Constitution’s mechanisms for framing decision making, it develops a
comprehensive approach to the identification and evaluation of the Constitution’s agenda-control
rules.
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entity with ultimate authority to act—or external in the sense of splitting the
power to decide what subject government will address from the power to act.
Finally, and related to the internal-external divide, the control of the
government’s agenda can be assigned either to a state actor or to a private
actor.
To taxonomize the constitutional law of agenda control in this fashion, I
draw upon two bodies of political science scholarship. The first body
empirically examines how government and the public shift their attention
between different policy issues, exploring the incentives for officials and
interest groups to compete for influence12 and the instruments they use to do
so.13
The second, commonly labeled as social choice theory,14 begins with a
pathmarking 1950 article by Kenneth Arrow.15 Arrow developed a “general
possibility theorem” that, in rough paraphrase, demonstrates that any process
for choosing between three or more individual preferences over “alternative
social states” will either produce incoherent results or, alternatively, violate
“reasonable-looking” conditions for democratic choice.16 In its simplest form,
this means that three individuals using a seemingly simple system of pairwise
voting with a majority rule, trying to choose amongst three options, can find
that the winner of any sequence of votes is vulnerable to defeat by another

12. FRANK R. BAUMGARTNER & BRIAN D. JONES, AGENDAS AND INSTABILITY IN AMERICAN
POLITICS (2d ed. 2009) (examining how policymakers obtain and use information to calibrate
legislative agendas); JOHN W. KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES, AND PUBLIC POLICIES 1–20 (2d
ed. 1995) (exploring, in general terms, how issues become part of the public agenda).
13. See, e.g., ROBERT W. BENNETT, TALKING IT THROUGH: PUZZLES OF AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY 37 (2003) (developing the concept of “conversational entrepreneurs,” who seed demand
among political elites for policy change); see also Dennis Chong & James N. Druckman, Framing
Theory, 10 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 103 (2007) (providing an overview of such framing effects).
14. My focus here is social choice literature catalyzed by Kenneth Arrow’s work on the
transformation of individual preferences into collective choices. For useful summaries of the key
technical results in this literature, see AMARTYA SEN, COLLECTIVE CHOICE AND SOCIAL WELFARE
(1970) [hereinafter SEN, COLLECTIVE CHOICE] and Amartya Sen, Social Choice Theory: A ReExamination, 45 ECONOMETRICA 53 (1977). This literature is distinct from the public choice
scholarship, which centers on the formation and behavior of various interest groups in the face of
collective action costs. See, e.g., MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC
GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 2 (1965). Social choice and public choice analyses are
sometimes linked to generate mutually reinforcing justifications for normative reform proposals. See,
e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 410
(1989) (invoking social choice theory to support “the findings of public choice theory [that] would
treat statutes as lacking coherent normative underpinnings”); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Politics
Without Romance: Implications of Public Choice Theory for Statutory Interpretation, 74 VA. L. REV.
275, 284 (1988) (invoking Arrow’s Theorem to similar ends).
15. Kenneth J. Arrow, A Difficulty in the Concept of Social Welfare, 58 J. POL. ECON. 328
(1950); see also KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (2d ed. 1963)
[hereinafter ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE] (providing a more extensive presentation of the theorem and its
consequences).
16. ERIC MASKIN & AMARTYA SEN, THE ARROW IMPOSSIBILITY THEOREM 33–36, 38
(2014).

1406

CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 104:1401

option.17 The result is known as instability, or cycling, because no result is
immune from being unsettled by another vote. Notwithstanding its
unfamiliarity, we can observe the phenomenon of cycling in daily political life.
Consider the 2016 Republican primary contest for president, in which voter
preferences may have “form[ed] a cycle in which the populist is preferred to
the conservative, who is preferred to the moderate, who is preferred to the
populist, even though the populist was preferred to the conservative, who was
preferred to the moderate.”18
The implications of social choice theory for the design of democratic
institutions are profound. In the influential gloss offered by political scientist
William Riker, Arrow’s Theorem shows that “so long as a society preserves
democratic institutions, its members can expect that some of their social
choices will be unordered or inconsistent.”19 Riker argued that those in power
can manipulate the agenda—or the inclination of participants to vote
strategically—to determine the outputs of a collective choice mechanism.20
Riker’s point is not that incoherence or instability always emerges. It is rather
that the pervasive possibility of instability undermines the normative force of
collective decisions involving more than two persons selecting between more
than two options—i.e., the choice conditions that are endemic to democratic
societies. The results of such democratic choice, on Riker’s view, hold no
claim to our attention because they might always be the result of elite
manipulation or strategic voting. Legal scholars have been cognizant of social
choice theory for decades now but have focused on its corrosive implications
for the coherence of legislative and judicial outputs in the spirit of Riker’s
critique.21

17. See infra text accompanying notes 38–39.
18. Justin Wolfers, Unusual Flavor of G.O.P. Primary Illustrates a Famous Paradox, N.Y.
TIMES (May 8, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/09/upshot/unusual-flavor-of-gop-primaryillustrates-a-famous-paradox.html [https://perma.cc/87EQ-HQZU].
19. WILLIAM H. RIKER, LIBERALISM AGAINST POPULISM 136 (1982) [hereinafter RIKER,
LIBERALISM AGAINST POPULISM].
20. Id.; accord DUNCAN BLACK, THE THEORY OF COMMITTEES AND ELECTIONS 39–40
(1958).
21. Judge Frank Easterbrook, for example, famously complained that it is “difficult,
sometimes impossible, to aggregate [legislators’ preferences] into a coherent collective choice.” Frank
H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 547 (1983); see also Lynn A. Stout, Strict
Scrutiny and Social Choice: An Economic Inquiry into Fundamental Rights and Suspect
Classifications, 80 GEO. L.J. 1787, 1822 (1992) (using Arrow’s Theorem to argue for more robust
judicial review); accord Frank H. Easterbrook, The Court and the Economic System, 98 HARV. L.
REV. 4, 51 (1984) (making the analog point that interest-group bargaining for legislative outcomes
may suffer from an empty core problem). To the extent this literature counsels for more searching
judicial review based on inferences about legislative incoherence, it suffers pervasively from a nirvana
problem because it fails to account for instability in multimember courts. For a penetrating critique
along these lines, see Maxwell L. Stearns, The Misguided Renaissance of Social Choice, 103 YALE
L.J. 1219, 1225–26 n.18, 1229–30 (1994) [hereinafter Stearns, Misguided Renaissance]. Similar
criticisms were lodged against the decisions of multimember courts. Michael E. Levine & Charles R.
Plott, Agenda Influence and Its Implications, 63 VA. L. REV. 561, 563 (1977) (“Decision making by
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This Article exploits a different insight from social choice theory: that
there are many different ways of managing instability in collective choice, such
that wholesale skepticism is an unnecessary response.22 The tools used for
managing instability, moreover, are more or less normatively defensible. The
constitutional law of agenda control, that is, can be an object of meaningful
normative evaluation, rather than a cause for despair about the integrity of
democracy.
Having demonstrated the utility of an agenda-control lens for legal
scholars, I then ask how successful the Framers’ initial distribution of agenda
control has been. The original institutional allocation of agenda-control powers,
I argue, has not proved durable. Rather, agenda control has diffused across
branch boundaries or from within government to nonstate actors. A central
change has been a large shift of authority to set agendas from Congress to both
the executive and (less often remarked) the judiciary. Building on earlier work
about the negotiated character of interbranch arrangements,23 I contend that
derogations from the constitutional law of agenda control are best explained by
political actors and branches who have traded their original agenda-control
authorities. The Constitution, in effect, has provided a framework for
bargaining, not a Procrustean network of constraints. The ensuing negotiated
redistribution of agenda control is an overlooked element of the history of
shifting interbranch relations over the past century. As such, the resulting
patterns of institutional change illuminate the dynamics of constitutional
change around the separation of powers.24

multi-judge appellate courts [and other collective decision makers] display[s] features that may make
them vulnerable to similar theoretical criticism [based on social choice].”); see also Lewis A.
Kornhauser, Modeling Collegial Courts. II. Legal Doctrine, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 441 (1992)
(identifying aggregation difficulties as a central problem in the analysis of multimember courts); Lewis
A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, Unpacking the Court, 96 YALE L.J. 82 (1986) (same).
22. Another line of legal scholarship attacks the assumptions and definitions of Arrow’s
Theorem, and in particular its definition of rationality. See, e.g., Richard H. Pildes & Elizabeth S.
Anderson, Slinging Arrows at Democracy: Social Choice Theory, Value Pluralism, and Democratic
Politics, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2121, 2146–58, 2192 (1990); see also Herbert Hovenkamp, Arrow’s
Theorem: Ordinalism and Republican Government, 75 IOWA L. REV. 949 (1990) (arguing that formal
assumptions of Arrow’s Theorem’s rarely hold). For a comprehensive response to such criticisms, see
JOHN W. PATTY & ELIZABETH MAGGIE PENN, SOCIAL CHOICE AND LEGITIMACY: THE POSSIBILITIES
OF IMPOSSIBILITY 32–33 (2014).
23. See Aziz Z. Huq, The Negotiated Structural Constitution, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1595
(2014) [hereinafter Huq, Negotiated Structural Constitution].
24. This is true in the separation of powers context. See, e.g., Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise
of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231, 1241, 1243 (1994) (pointing to “the demise of
the nondelegation doctrine” and the “Death of the Unitary Executive” as motors of change in the
constitutional dispensation); see also Kathryn A. Watts, Rulemaking as Legislating, 103 GEO. L.J.
1003, 1016 (2015) (characterizing extant constraints on legislative delegation as “toothless”). It is also
true in the federalism context. See David S. Rubenstein, The Paradox of Administrative Preemption,
38 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 267, 304 (2015) (“Today, however, the enumerated-powers principle
hardly restrains Congress’s substantive power.”).
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The Article proceeds in three parts. Part I sets the stage by explaining why
agenda control is a consequential margin of constitutional design by mining the
aforementioned two bodies of political science research. Part II identifies the
heterogeneous solutions to the problem of agenda control found in the original
Constitution, focusing on the separation of powers. It develops a taxonomical
framework for classifying and evaluating agenda-control instruments. Part III
evaluates how the Framers’ choices fared. It demonstrates that the branches
have traded agenda control in ways that have critically shaped the historical
trajectory of institutional development. It finally addresses the normative
question of how the ensuing changes should be evaluated.
I.
AGENDA CONTROL AS AN OBJECT OF CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN
Theorists of constitutional design as early as Rousseau have recognized
the importance of agenda control.25 Drawing on that literature, this Section
unearths two general grounds for attending to the question. The first draws on
an empirical literature by political scientists about the formation of national
policy agendas. The second mines social choice scholarship to show why
agenda control is inevitably a part of constitutional design.
A. The Circumstances of Democratic Choice
Although constitutional adjudication is intensely focused on limiting the
state, constitutional design is not solely a matter of constraint. Before
constraint, constitutions must articulate basic forms of the state as a framework
for ongoing governance.26 The U.S. Constitution, for instance, is a “blueprint
for democratic governance.”27 To further this end, the Constitution accounts for
how democratic contestation unfurls. In three ways, the quotidian
circumstances of democratic politics create a call for constitutional agendacontrol instruments.

25. See John T. Scott, Rousseau’s Anti-Agenda-Setting Agenda and Contemporary
Democratic Theory, 99 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 137, 140–41 (2005) (discussing how Rousseau in The
Social Contract envisaged the allocation of power to initiate policy making to the legislative branch).
Scott’s analysis is a persuasive response to an earlier suggestion that Rousseau allocated agenda
control to experts in the government. Ethan Putterman, Rousseau on Agenda-Setting and MajorityRule, 97 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 459, 468 (2003) (reading Rousseau as envisaging “expert agenda-setters
[who] would enhance and facilitate citizen participation”).
26. The enabling function of constitutional design is stressed by STEPHEN HOLMES, PASSIONS
AND CONSTRAINTS: ON THE THEORY OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 163 (1995) (comparing constitutional
rules to grammatical rules, which “do not merely retrain a speaker” but also “allow interlocutors to do
many things they would not otherwise have been able to do or even have thought of doing”).
27. Samuel Issacharoff, The Enabling Role of Democratic Constitutionalism: Fixed Rules and
Some Implications for Contested Presidential Elections, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1985, 1995 (2003) (emphasis
added). Not all constitutions, of course, strive toward democratic government. TOM GINSBURG &
ALBERTO SIMPSER, CONSTITUTIONS IN AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES 4–5 (2014) (explaining the
function of constitutions in authoritarian regimes).
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First, governments are typically confronted with “a great number of real,
tangible issues” at any one moment but “can attend to them only one at a
time.”28 The first step of democratic choice, therefore, is sorting a subclass of
issues to consider.29 This requires creation of a “list of subjects or problems to
which governmental officials, and people outside of government closely
associated with those officials, are paying some serious attention at any given
time.”30 Such lists are not defined by exogenous shocks alone. Even casual
acquaintance with the rhythms of national politics should reveal that mere
media attention—be it to a drought in the western states, a looming federal
deficit, a crime wave, or an immigration surge on the southern border—does
not suffice to elicit new legislation or regulation. Such governmental action
requires conscious mobilization, typically by political elites, to mold crisis into
an occasion for state action.31
Second, once an issue advances onto the government’s radar, there are
almost always nonbinary choices between paths of state action. For instance,
consider that civil and criminal regulatory options are often potential responses
to a social problem. That we decide on one course to the exclusion of the other
can blind us later to the need for a choice. Hence, early in the so-called war on
drugs, many politicians struggled to decide whether a rehabilitative approach or
a punitive approach would work better.32 That the rehabilitative ideal has
drifted from view should not blind us to its availability in the first instance.
Moreover, proposals to criminalize implicate decisions about how to
calibrate a continuous variable of sentence severity. Noncriminal regulation
also requires choices about the appropriate form of regulation (e.g., commandand-control versus market mechanisms), the mix of public and private
enforcement, and the range of legal and equitable remedies. In many domains,
officials face plural, incompatible regulatory approaches. In the healthcare
context, for example, Congress recently had to elect between (among other
options) a Canadian-style single payer system, an expansion of employer-based
coverage, or an individual-mandate approach to market correction.33 A
democratic constitution, therefore, might address how policy options are sifted
and narrowed down at various stages of the deliberative process.

28. BAUMGARTNER & JONES, supra note 12, at 10.
29. See David A. Rochefort & Robert W. Cobb, Problem Definition, Agenda Access, and
Policy Choice, 21 POL’Y STUD. J. 56, 56 (1993).
30. KINGDON, supra note 12, at 3.
31. See, e.g., BENNETT, supra note 13, at 3. For a brilliant demonstration of this point in the
crime policy context, see Vesla M. Weaver, Frontlash: Race and the Development of Punitive Crime
Policy, 21 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 230, 234–36 (2007).
32. See, e.g., Michael Tonry, Sentencing in America, 1975–2025, 42 CRIME & JUST. 141, 148
(2013) (discussing the decline of the rehabilitative ideal).
33. Congress was familiar with this range of options. Matthew P. Harrington, Health Care
Crimes: Avoiding Overenforcement, 26 RUTGERS L.J. 111, 111–12 (1994) (describing considerations
of these options during President Clinton’s effort to obtain a new healthcare law during the 103rd
Congress).
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Third, the government’s agenda is typically an object of interest-group
contestation that requires channeling and resolution. Interest groups mobilize to
elevate novel issues onto the government’s agenda, frame those issues so as to
maximize their comparative advantage,34 and engage in “negative blocking” of
disfavored issues.35 Interest groups also shape the range of policy options
officials might consider. As the national economy expands in complexity,
interest groups grow in “number and diversity.”36 They increasingly supply a
“legislative subsidy”37 in the form of policy information, political intelligence,
and legislative labor to strategically selected legislators. This epistemic role
situates interest groups to shape both how issues are defined38 and problems
remedied.39 An important role of the Constitution is channeling and harnessing
such activity into productive legislative form.
It is possible to imagine a minimalist constitution that declined to speak to
any of these questions. Indeed, I have argued elsewhere for the tractability of a
minimalist definition of a constitution.40 Rather than being logically necessary
elements of a written constitution such as our own, institutional design
elements that respond to the plurality of possible public-policy issues and
solutions, as well as the play of interest groups, are simply wise and
appropriate pieces of a democratic constitution.
B. Agenda Control as an Equilibrating Device in the Context of
Collective Choice
Social choice theory illuminates a second important justification for
agenda-control instruments in constitutional design. This literature identifies
irreconcilable tensions between demands for coherence and demands for
minimal democratic credentials in collective choice mechanisms. It teaches that
34. Olson’s canonical work on public choice suggests that the efficacy of an interest group is
inversely correlated to its transaction cost of mobilization. OLSON, supra note 14, at 2.
35. KINGDON, supra note 12, at 46, 48–49 (finding that “interest groups loom very large
indeed” in agenda-control efforts).
36. BAUMGARTNER & JONES, supra note 12, at 177.
37. Richard L. Hall & Alan V. Deardorff, Lobbying as Legislative Subsidy, 100 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 69, 69–70 (2006). Access to legislators to provide information, however, appears to be a function
of campaign contributions. See Joshua L. Kalla & David E. Broockman, Campaign Contributions
Facilitate Access to Congressional Officials: A Randomized Field Experiment, 60 AM. J. POL. SCI.
545, 553 (2015) (finding that lobbyists had four times more access to congressional staff when they
made campaign contributions than when they did not).
38. See DEBORAH STONE, POLICY PARADOX: THE ART OF POLITICAL DECISION MAKING 309
(1997) (“Political debates on policy issues are often portrayed as a conflict over competing definitions
of a social condition.”). Questions of causation provide an especially fruitful object of interest-group
contestation. Deborah A. Stone, Causal Stories and the Formation of Policy Agendas, 104 POL. SCI.
Q. 281, 283 (1989).
39. Cf. BAUMGARTNER & JONES, supra note 12, at 29 (“[M]uch of the policy process is
determined by the artful connection of solutions to problems.”).
40. Aziz Z. Huq, Hippocratic Constitutional Design, in ASSESSING CONSTITUTIONAL
PERFORMANCE 39 (Tom Ginsburg & Aziz Z. Huq eds., 2016) (identifying as a minimal criterion of
constitutional success the enabling of some form of a state as a going concern).

2016]

THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF AGENDA CONTROL

1411

instability—in the sense that no outcome will defeat all other outcomes—is
imminently possible in all normatively plausible mechanisms for aggregating
the preferences of more than two decision makers over more than two choices.
The need to recognize and address instability haunts democratic constitutional
design. As a result, a constitution’s framers face difficult trade-offs between the
risks of instability in collective outcomes, strategic voting, and abuse of agenda
control.
To unpack these basic points, this Section briefly sets forth some core
results of social choice theory. First, key technical results—most importantly,
Arrow’s original theorem—are summarized in nontechnical terms. Second, I
elaborate institutional implications of those results, focusing on the role of
agenda control and strategic voting in suppressing institutional instability.
Finally, I map the government actions that potentially implicate cycling.
1. Instability and Incoherence in Collective Choice
Consider three individuals (1, 2, and 3) with three options (A, B, and C)
and the following distribution of preferences (where “” stands for “is
preferred to”):
Table 1: The Condorcet Cycle
Person
1
2
3

Order of Preferences
A›B›C
B›C›A
C›A›B

The three individuals use a majority-vote rule to choose between two of
the options in a series of three votes: A against B, B against C, and A against C.
In this sequence of votes: A beats B, B beats C, and then C beats A. In other
words, a majority-vote rule41 generates a series of transitive outcomes, or what
is termed a Condorcet cycle.42 In this and many other collective choice
situations, there is no Condorcet winner: an option that beats all others in
pairwise voting.43 An examination of Table 1 demonstrates that any outcome,
A, B, or C, can be destabilized by a new majority-rule vote and that there will
always be someone who stands to gain from seeking that vote. For example,
once C is selected, 1 will request a vote on C versus B. For this reason, the
results in Table 1 exemplify instability or cycling. These results can also be
41. Id. The formal properties of majority-vote rule (i.e., a decision procedure in which a
numerical majority of votes is sufficient and necessary to change the status quo), are examined in
ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY (1957).
42. PATTY & PENN, supra note 22, at 13.
43. Id.
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labeled incoherent insofar as there seems to be no singular way of translating
individual preferences into a single “right” outcome that represents a single
collective choice.44
Arrow’s Theorem implies that “many minimally democratic systems will
in some situation produce an intransitive ordering . . . similar to [a Condorcet
cycle].”45 As updated in 1963,46 Arrow’s Theorem identifies four criteria that a
reasonable mechanism for aggregating individual preferences into a collective
choice should meet: (1) it should be Pareto efficient: if every individual prefers
A to B, A should prevail; (2) it should satisfy the independence-of-irrelevantalternatives condition: when ranking two alternatives, A and B, preferences
over C should not affect outcomes;47 (3) it should be transitive: it should
produce an unambiguous winner or collection of winners;48 and (4) it should be
non-dictatorial: it should respond to the preferences of more than one person.
The nub of Arrow’s result is that there is no aggregation rule—not majority
rule, supermajority rules, plurality vote rules, Borda count, and not the
market49—that consistently satisfies all these conditions. To generate coherent
outputs across all cases, Arrow’s Theorem holds, the mechanism must give
way along one of these four margins.
Subsequent theoretical work extends and refines this basic result. For
example, later studies examined the possibility of cycling under majority rule. 50
Building on Arrow’s initial result, Charles Plott and others demonstrated that a
majority-vote rule generate transitive outputs in only a limited set of cases.51
44. William Riker identifies a “populist interpretation of voting” to the effect that “the
opinion[s] of the majority must be right and must be respected because the will of the people is the
liberty of the people.” RIKER, LIBERALISM AGAINST POPULISM, supra note 19, at 14. But, it is hardly
clear any theorist endorses such a view. See Joshua Cohen, An Epistemic Conception of Democracy,
97 ETHICS 26, 27–28 (1986) (discussing Rousseau’s and Bentham’s views).
45. PATTY & PENN, supra note 22, at 14.
46. The following account draws on the elegant account in MASKIN & SEN, supra note 16, at
33–38, and the more extended and technical treatment in PATTY & PENN, supra note 22, at 20–69
(explaining the theorem and offered extended defenses of each condition). The version of the theorem
set forth here was first developed in ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE, supra note 15, at 22–33.
47. Lest this sound arcane, consider the use of plurality vote rule in presidential elections,
where the choice between two main party candidates A and B can be altered by the presence of a
“spoiler” third candidate C. “The independence axiom serves to rule out spoilers.” MASKIN & SEN,
supra note 16, at 48.
48. In MASKIN & SEN, the third criterion is “unrestricted domain,” which requires that “[f]or
any logically possible set of individual preferences, there is a social ordering R.” Id. at 34. This
emphasizes the fact that the aggregation rule cannot ex ante rule out by fiat a subset of alternative
options as a way of generating intransitivity.
49. See Saul Levmore, Public Choice Defended, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 777, 781 n.17 (2005).
50. There are plenty of reasons for endorsing majority rule as a desirable aggregation rule. See
Kenneth O. May, A Set of Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision, 20
ECONOMETRICA 680 (1952).
51. A majority-vote rule generates stable outputs when there is only one issue to decide, where
preferences or interests are similar or nearly unanimous, and where preferences are delicately balanced
against each other. See William H. Riker & Barry R. Weingast, Constitutional Regulation of
Legislative Choice: The Political Consequences of Judicial Deference to Legislatures, 74 VA. L. REV.
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Another vein of theoretical work, developed by Allen Gibbard and Mark
Satterthwaite, examined the tendency of preference aggregation mechanisms to
elicit strategic or insincere behavior. They demonstrated that every nontrivial
preference mechanism (except for a dictator) can elicit strategic voting from
participants.52 Finally, Richard McKelvey demonstrated that when a
preference-aggregation mechanism engenders potential voting cycles there is
always an agenda that, once chosen, will lead to the choice of any possible
policy alternative within the space of options under consideration.53 In later
work, McKelvey identified distributions of preferences and voting rules for
which the possibility of cycling (and, hence, of manipulation by agenda
control) is relatively low.54 These results illustrate that allocations of agenda
control dramatically change the stability, coherence, and substance of outputs
from collective choice mechanisms.
Powell v. McCormack presents a useful example of agenda control and
cycling. New York Representative Adam Clayton Powell challenged the House
of Representatives’s decision to vote to exclude him from the 90th Congress.55
In brief, the House was faced with three options: imposing a fine and
reprimanding Powell; seating and then expelling him by a two-third vote as
specified in Article I, Section V; or excluding him by a simple majority vote. 56
By choosing the sequence in which these options were presented, the House
leadership could influence which would be chosen. The first vote resulted in a
close rejection of the fine-and-reprimand option.57 It was arguably only then
that a supermajority of representatives—faced with the choice of excluding
Powell or not punishing him at all—coalesced behind the decision to exclude
him. As the Court rightly noted, had the sequence of votes been different—for
example, had the House voted on exclusion before censure—the result might
373, 382 (1988); see also Charles R. Plott, A Notion of Equilibrium and Its Possibility Under Majority
Rule, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 787, 791–92 (1967) (demonstrating formally that under conditions of
majority rule, a stable equilibrium outcome “would only be an accident (and a highly improbable
one)”).
52. See Allen Gibbard, Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result, 41
ECONOMETRICA 587, 587 (1973) (asserting that any nondictatorial voting scheme with at least three
possible outcomes is subject to individual manipulation); see also Mark A. Satterthwaite, StrategyProofness and Arrow’s Conditions: Existence and Correspondence Theorems for Voting Procedures
and Social Welfare Functions, 10 J. ECON. THEORY 187, 193, 192–202 (1975).
53. Richard D. McKelvey, Intransitivities in Multidimensional Voting Models and Some
Implications for Agenda Control, 12 J. ECON. THEORY 472, 472 (1976) (demonstrating that “where all
voters evaluate policy in terms of a Euclidean metric, if there is no equilibrium outcome . . . it is
theoretically possible to design voting procedures which, starting from any given point, will end up at
any other point in the space of alternatives”); RIKER, LIBERALISM AGAINST POPULISM, supra note 19,
at 187 (providing a summary of McKelvey’s result).
54. Richard D. McKelvey, Covering, Dominance, and Institution-Free Properties of Social
Choice, 30 AM. J. POL. SCI. 283, 283 (1986); see also Norman Schofield et al., The Core and the
Stability of Group Choice in Spatial Voting Games, 82 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 195, 207–08 (1988).
55. 395 U.S. 486, 490 (1969).
56. Id. at 491–93.
57. Id. at 491.
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well have been different.58 The facts of Powell illustrate how the agenda
setter’s power to stipulate the sequence and the nature of votes can strongly
influence the outcome of a collective decision-making process.59
Such examples, though, should be taken with some caution. Neither
Arrow’s Theorem nor its extensions are empirical in nature. They do not
predict the frequency of instability under any given decision rule.60 There is
vigorous, ongoing debate about how often either Cordorcetian cycling or other
forms of instability occur in real-world political institutions.61 There is also
disagreement as to whether the possibility of strategic voting necessarily
implies actual strategic voting.62 Nevertheless, the absence of instability (in the
form of Condorcet cycles) does not mean an aggregation rule is invulnerable to
incoherence or instability critiques. In part, this is because instability might not
arise due to the exercise of a strategic agenda control (as McKelvey shows) or
strategic voting (as Gibbard and Satterthwaite predict).
From the perspective of the constitutional framer, social choice theoretical
results have bite regardless of instability’s empirical frequency. Typically,
constitutional designers strive to create an enduring document.63 This requires a
collective choice mechanism that works with many different permutations of
popular preferences. This means addressing the cycling that can emerge in
respect to what issues to take up, and also which policy proposals to pursue.
The constitutional designer cannot assume that the distribution of preferences
at either stage will be such that instability and incoherence will not be
concerns.
58. Id. at 510 (“[W]e will not assume that two-thirds of its members would have expelled
Powell for his prior conduct had the Speaker announced that House Resolution No. 278 was for
expulsion rather than exclusion.”).
59. Another useful example of cycling comes from the congressional debate in 1861 as to
whether to tax land or wealth. The instability produced by cycling between variations on these options
proved destabilizing until the alternative proposal of taxing income was introduced and prevailed
because no one was certain what its distributive effects would be. James E. Alt, The Evolution of Tax
Structures, 41 PUB. CHOICE 181 (1983).
60. Riker & Weingast, supra note 51, at 382 (“Arrow’s Theorem is a possibility theorem. It
says only that an event can occur, not that it will occur or has often occurred.”).
61. Compare id. at 388–93 (providing examples from congressional debates), with GERRY
MACKIE, DEMOCRACY DEFENDED (2003) (rejecting examples).
62. SEN, COLLECTIVE CHOICE, supra note 14, at 195 (arguing that in many democratic choice
situations, people are “guided not so much by maximization of expected utility, but something much
simpler, viz, just a desire to record one’s true preference”). Elsewhere, Sen develops the concept of a
commitment, defined “in terms of a person choosing an act that he believes will yield a lower level of
personal welfare to him than an alternative that is also available to him,” as an explanation for the
refusal to engage in strategic voting. Amartya K. Sen, Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral
Foundations of Economic Theory, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 317, 327 (1977). For another skeptical view of
the relevance of the Gibbard-Sattherthwaite and McKelvey results, see Bernard Grofman, Public
Choice, Civil Republicanism, and American Politics: Perspectives of A “Reasonable Choice”
Modeler, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1541, 1554 (1993).
63. But perhaps this is a mistake: the average duration of a constitution is only seventeen
years. ZACHARY ELKINS, TOM GINSBURG & JAMES MELTON, THE ENDURANCE OF NATIONAL
CONSTITUTIONS 120 (2009). The U.S. Constitution is an outlier. Id. at 101.
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2. Institutional Responses to Instability in Collective Choice: Agenda
Control and Strategic Voting
A central implication of Arrow’s Theorem for constitutional design is that
that each task must begin by “identifying which assumption(s) is relaxed for
each institution” and proceed by “comparing the ability of a given institution to
which collective decision-making responsibility has been assigned under the
Constitution to issue a rational collective decision.”64 Comparative judgments
are inevitable in practice because every method of collective choice will fall
short of meeting all four of Arrow’s conditions.
There are, roughly speaking, three general categories of responses to
instability in collective choice mechanisms. I set these forth to begin with but
must stress at the outset that my analysis focuses largely on the third response.
First, a designer might tolerate a certain degree of instability within a
preference-aggregation system. This might be justified on pluralist grounds as
“provid[ing] a way to avoid rejecting some fundamental values in situations
when not all can be satisfied at once.”65 Second, certain collective choice
mechanisms do not allow cycling because they stipulate a fixed number of
“rounds” of voting. Such mechanisms do, however, invite strategic voting. The
plurality-voting rule used in presidential elections, for example, will often
mean that “supporters of third parties vote for their second choice in order to
defeat the major party candidate they like the least.”66 The GibbardSatterthwaite finding of strategic voting’s pervasiveness suggests that the
institutional design question is not whether to allow strategic voting—it is
endemic and inevitable—but, rather, whether to adopt measures to dampen or
to eliminate it.
The third possibility—which most concerns me here—is that a designer
will arrange a collective choice mechanism to allocate agenda control among
institutional players in some stable, regular, and legitimate way. Institutional
designers, as Kenneth Shepsle and Barry Weingast observe, can strive for
“structure-induced equilibrium” by carefully channeling “the sometimes subtle
influence provided by control over structure and procedure.”67 Conscious

64. Stearns, Misguided Renaissance, supra note 21, at 1232; see also Saul Levmore, From
Cynicism to Positive Theory in Public Choice, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 375, 375 (2002) (noting that the
takeaway of aggregation paradoxes for legal theorists need not be skepticism; rather, their recognition
should lead to “the study of how we do the best we can in the face of difficulties”).
65. Pildes & Anderson, supra note 22, at 2171–72.
66. RIKER, LIBERALISM AGAINST POPULISM, supra note 19, at 145–51.
67. Kenneth A. Shepsle, Studying Institutions: Some Lessons from the Rational Choice
Approach, 1 J. THEORETICAL POL. 131, 136–37 (1989) (“[A] structure induced equilibrium may be
defined as an alternative . . . that is invulnerable in the sense that no other alternative, allowed by the
rules of procedure, is preferred by all individuals, structural units, and coalitions that possess
distinctive veto or voting power.”); Kenneth A. Shepsle & Barry R. Weingast, Structure-Induced
Equilibrium and Legislative Choice, 37 PUB. CHOICE 503, 507–14 (1981) (analyzing a series of
equilibrium-inducing institutional design options).
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allocation of agenda control to institutions is justified because it should elicit
regularity and stability in state action.68
What does it mean to assign agenda control? Social choice literature
suggests that the term “agenda control” has a capacious meaning. At a
minimum, it captures a class of cases in which collective choice is required to
begin or end with certain steps, and where the structure of a multistage
aggregation rule determines outcomes.69 But it sweeps wider than this. Riker
commented on the “significance, variety and pervasiveness” of agenda-control
instruments.70 They include powers to initiate policy making, to veto proposals,
to identify policymakers, to resolve ambiguities in extant policies, and to
determine who may offer proposals. Consistent with this view, I develop in
Part II.A a capacious taxonomy of agenda-control instruments observed within
the U.S. Constitution.
In sum, I draw a rather different lesson for institutional design from the
social choice literature than some of earlier scholars. Until now, the skeptical
possibilities of Arrovian instability have transfixed legal scholars, motivating
coruscating critiques of both legislative and multimember courts’ decisions.
Skepticism, though, is not a necessary inference from social choice theory.71

68. Accord William H. Riker, Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the
Study of Institutions, 74 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 432, 443 (1980); see also Terry M. Moe, Political
Institutions: The Neglected Side of the Story, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 213, 216 (1990) (“Politics is stable
because of the distinctive roles that institutions play,” in particular in determining ex ante “what
alternatives get considered, in what order, and by whom.”).
69. See ROBERT D. COOTER, THE STRATEGIC CONSTITUTION 43–46 (2000) (describing the
process in which agenda control chooses outcomes); accord Grant M. Hayden, Note, Some
Implications of Arrow’s Theorem for Voting Rights, 47 STAN. L. REV. 295, 299 (1995) (suggesting
that intransitivity leads to dictatorial power being exercised in a social choice function by agenda
setters).
70. RIKER, LIBERALISM AGAINST POPULISM, supra note 19, at 169.
71. In a much cited piece, Richard Pildes and Elizabeth Anderson treat Arrow’s Theorem as a
threat to the normative force of democracy but respond that “because the values people care about in
individual choice and democratic politics are plural and often incommensurable, those values cannot
be expressed adequately through consistent preference rankings over outcomes described in the sparse
terms available to social choice theory.” Pildes & Anderson, supra note 22, at 2142; id. at 2160–61
(giving an example of inconsistent individual preferences); see also id. at 2186 (identifying as their
target “the claim that social choice theory ‘proves’ that democratic systems cannot be rationally
responsive to citizens’ desires, values, and interests”). Aggregation, on this account, is an incomplete
method for realizing democratic choice. Id. This is a “narrow” view of social choice theory’s
implications. PATTY & PENN, supra note 22, at 32–33 (faulting Pildes and Anderson for insisting on
the need for social norms and institutional rules, while simultaneously “miss[ing] the crucial point:
[Arrow’s and subsequent] results . . . indicate why . . . norms, rules, and practices are required to
produce meaningful and coherent democratic outcomes”). Of note here, Pildes and Anderson do not
categorically deny the need for some form of aggregation mechanism in a democratic polity. To the
contrary, they recognize that social choice theory can help isolate some of the trade-offs implicit in
democratic institutional design. Pildes & Anderson, supra note 22, at 2196 (recognizing that
sometimes “agenda-setting elite[s]” exist, and the relevant normative question “whether the [agenda
control] power is managed, distributed, or contained in ways that over time further democratic
values”). They do not, however, pursue in detail the range of institutional responses resolving tradeoffs generated in the design of collective choice mechanisms.
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Although its core results cast doubt on the possibility of identifying in all cases
a single outcome as the unique product of collective choice, Arrow’s Theorem
hardly implies that democratic institutional design is a fool’s errand. There is
no need to assume that a unique collective choice, as opposed to a “set of
acceptable outcomes,” exists. Arrow’s Theorem suggests that an aggregation
mechanism that can provide at least some evidence of individuals’ summed
judgments is useful.72 With this weaker ambition in hand, one of many
aggregation rules that operate as “pretty good truth tracker[s]” may suffice.73
***
This Section identifies two reasons why a constitution must address
agenda control. First, the circumstances of democratic politics in an extended,
heterogeneous republic present state actors with many more potential objects of
regulation than can feasibly be tackled at a single time. Exogenous shocks
alone do not establish priorities, and capacity constraints mean there is a need
to integrate some kind of agenda-control instrument into the fabric of national
policy-making institutions.
Second, even once an issue has been identified as appropriate for
regulation, any collective state actor confronts a cluster of difficulties in
reaching a final policy decision that can be enacted and maintained in
equilibrium. The social choice literature points toward a need for constitutional
structures that induce equilibrium. It demonstrates that the design of collective
choice mechanisms necessitates a trade-off between different goals, in
particular the nondictatorship and unrestricted domain conditions. Agendacontrol instruments, moreover, come in different flavors. Different
circumstances may warrant different solutions. A fair implication of the social
choice literature, therefore, is that a constitutional designer must exercise a
measure of judgment over which agenda-control instruments to use.

72. Jules Coleman & John Ferejohn, Democracy and Social Choice, 97 ETHICS 6, 15 (1986)
(developing, in response to Riker, a series of defenses of the meaningfulness of collective choice given
Arrow’s Theorem); see also Pildes & Anderson, supra note 22, at 2187 (rejecting consistency as a
criteria of rationality).
73. Gerry Mackie, The Reception of Social Choice Theory by Democratic Theory, in
MAJORITY DECISIONS: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES 77, 89 (Stéphanie Novak & Jon Elster eds.,
2014). A more recent effort to define a nonempty class of legitimate choice procedures, developed by
John Patty and Elizabeth Penn, focuses on internal consistency and stability of that mechanism. On
their view, internal stability requires (1) sensibility of outcome—i.e., “no alternative in the sequence of
considered alternatives is strictly superior to the final choice”; (2) sequence coherence—that the “order
of decision-making not contradict the presumption that reasoning was guided by the underlying
principle”; and (3) stability, which “implies that inclusion of any alternative in the decision sequence
would either introduce a policy that is incomparable to the final policy choice or violate internal
consistency.” PATTY & PENN, supra note 22, at 91–103. They demonstrate that “the set of legitimate
choices is always well defined and non empty.” Id. at 119. Although I do not apply their notion of
legitimate choice here—which does not plainly fit any constitutional mechanism—Patty and Penn’s
work demonstrates how social choice theory can accommodate normative theories that distinguish
desirable from undesirable decision rules.
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II.
AGENDA-CONTROL INSTRUMENTS IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
This Section develops a taxonomical account of agenda-control
instruments originally found in the Constitution. I begin by offering a working
definition of “agenda control” tailored to constitutional analysis. I then identify
agenda-control rules in the original constitutional text. My focus here is on
interbranch relations, where problems of agenda control loom large and where
the Framers’ design choices can be picked out with greatest perspicuity. That is
not to say that agenda control does not emerge as a design choice elsewhere in
constitutional law; it is simply that the separation of powers context is one in
which problems of agenda control loom prominently.74
A. A Definition of Agenda Control
The term “agenda control” is widely used in both the policy-making
literature and the social choice literature. Nevertheless, it does not have a clear
sense. Instead, a working definition for constitutional analysis must be stitched
together from hints, allusions, and theories from across a broad field of political
science and legal scholarship.
To begin, scholars working in the empirical political science literature on
continuity and change in national policy making treat policy agendas as the
product of plural social forces, including interest groups, media, and official
actors.75 This literature is not focused on questions of institutional design or
legal rules and hence has no need for precise identification of the institutional
forms of agenda control. In contrast, the social choice literature is centrally
74. Consider, for example, federalism. On the one hand, collective state action via treaty is
prohibited. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. This means that states do not need a mechanism to resolve
agenda-control problems in the mine run of things. Nevertheless, states have developed a suite of
subconstitutional organizations, such as associations, to engage in collective action. See Aziz Z. Huq,
Does the Logic of Collective Action Explain Federalism Doctrine?, 66 STAN. L. REV. 217, 288–92
(2014) (documenting informal solutions to facilitate states’ collective action). Article V, moreover,
anticipates two forms of supermajoritarian state action to propose and ratify amendments. It is possible
to imagine cycles emerging in the ratification process if states were able to first ratify and then rescind
their acquiescence to an amendment. States’ power to rescind is unclear. On the one hand, judicial
precedent sparked by Kansas’s attempted rescission of the child labor amendment suggests withdrawal
is impermissible. See Coleman v. Miller, 71 P.2d 518, 524–26 (Kan. 1937), aff’d on other grounds,
307 U.S. 433 (1939). On the other hand, the 1924 Wadsworth-Garrett proposal to amend Article V
would have provided that “until three-fourths of the States have ratified or more than one-fourth of the
States have rejected or defeated a proposed amendment, any State may change its vote.” 65 CONG.
REC. 4492–93 (1924); 66 CONG. REC. 2159 (1925). A rule against rescinding ratification might be
justified as a solution to Arrovian instability, at the cost of making amendments harder to enact. Given
the difficulty of changing the constitutional text at present, the latter’s marginal cost may be minimal.
Cf. Aziz Z. Huq, The Function of Article V, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1165 (2014). A discussion of agendacontrol instruments in the federalism context, in short, would not want for richness.
75. See BAUMGARTNER & JONES, supra note 12, at 59–82, 175–92 (documenting the roles of
a similarly variegated set of actors and social forces); KINGDON, supra note 12, at 20 (including
interest groups, legislative coalitions, the administration, and the “national mood” as causal forces in
agenda creation).
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concerned with the design of aggregation mechanisms such as elections,
legislative processes, and adjudication. Nevertheless, a clear definition of
agenda control does not emerge from the social choice literature either.
Although Riker points to examples such as the legislative leadership’s ability to
“select alternatives among with decisions will be made, and . . . procedures for
coming to a choice,”76 he does not provide a comprehensive definition.
More usefully, Patty and Penn define “the agenda” as the act of
“constructing the decision sequence [of options and expressions of preferences
through voting or otherwise].”77 They further observe that “a common thread
among political institution[s]” is that powers of “proposing, shepherding, and
defending potential policy choices [are] generally explicitly assigned to one or
more individuals.”78 Their analysis suggests that agenda control encompasses
control not just of a starting point for deliberation but also the length, structure,
and composition of its sequence.79 Consistent with this approach, Levine and
Plott posit that an agenda has two functions: “it limits the information available
to individual decision-makers” and “determines the set of strategies
available.”80 Similarly, Stearns observes that agenda control includes timingrelated powers to set “[d]eadlines and limitations on reconsideration.”81
Consistent with these approaches, the following definition of agenda
control can furnish a starting point for the analysis of constitutional rules. As I
use the term, a constitutional agenda-control rule is one that: (1) is found in
constitutional text or jurisprudence; and (2) vests an office, person, or
organization, explicitly or implicitly, with authority to define the persons
involved in, or the substantive scope, timing, voting rule, or sequencing of a
decision-making process that can generate a legal rule or other outcome with
the force and effect of law. More informally, agenda-control rules directly
concern the who and the how of state power, not questions of what may be
done.

76. RIKER, LIBERALISM AGAINST POPULISM, supra note 19, at 169; id. at 173–74 (supplying
the example of Pliny the Younger’s control of the structure of voting in the Roman Senate).
77. PATTY & PENN, supra note 22, at 93; see also Pildes & Anderson, supra note 22, at 2194
n.187 (refraining from giving a definition of agenda control, but intimating that it includes
“establishing sequences of decisions”). For other discussions of agenda control that focus on sequence
alone, see Levine & Plott, supra note 21, at 564.
78. PATTY & PENN, supra note 22, at 125.
79. This is consistent with Banks’s definition of an agenda as “a means of facilitating the
decision problem of voters when faced with a set of alternatives . . . an ordering of the alternatives
from which pairwise comparisons may be made.” J.S. Banks, Sophisticated Voting Outcomes and
Agenda Control, 1 SOC. CHOICE 295, 295 (1985).
80. Levine & Plott, supra note 21, at 564–65.
81. Stearns, Misguided Renaissance, supra note 21, at 1273; see also Mattias K. Polborn &
Gerald Willmann, Optimal Agenda-Setter Timing, 42 CANADIAN J. ECON. 1527, 1536 (2009)
(modeling agenda control in a committee context and demonstrating that part of its value is the power
to alter the timing of a decision in ways that change the option value of learning more about a policy
for other participants).
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Because it does not include boundary-setting rules concerning the reach of
state power, this definition of agenda-control rules marks out a species of
constitutional question distinct and separate from the modal puzzles of
constitutional jurisprudence and scholarship.82 It also distinguishes the
constitutional law of agenda control from a related—but nonconstitutional—
body of congressional procedures for organizing the internal legislative
process. Legislative procedures, which each chamber produces endogenously,83
distribute powers of agenda control among various members of Congress to
important effect. Although the Constitution licenses such rules—allocating
their authorship to distinct chambers—I keep the specific content of those rules
largely outside this analysis so as to keep my project tractable.84
B. Agenda Control and Congress
This Section identifies a series of instruments in Article I and beyond that
stabilize legislative outcomes, and in doing so, parcel out authority to select
some issues rather than others for governmental attention. In other words,
solving Congress’s social choice problem determines which governmental
actors have power to set the public policy agenda.
The Constitution disperses lawmaking power between two chambers of
Congress and the President by assigning different agenda control to different
institutional actors. One example of agenda control, found in the Origination
Clause of Article I, Section 7, Clause 1, is the House’s authority to initiate the
legislative process on fiscal matters.85 Another is embodied in the subsequent

82. I also exclude a wide range of other kinds of constitutional rules. These include, for
example, the selection of officials, see, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 2, 5 (selection rules for
representatives and senators); the punishment of officials, see, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 4; id. §
3, cl. 6 (impeachment); or textual amendment of the Constitution, see, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. V, among
other matters. Agenda-control questions do, nevertheless, arise in respect to these provisions.
Consider, for example the sequence of action envisaged by the impeachment clauses, with the House
first voting articles of impeachment, and then the Senate trying those articles alone. In the mine run of
things, this likely means the Senate’s preferences operate as a constraint on the House, for a House
focused on impeachment will necessarily anticipate the likely preferences of the Senate in crafting
impeachment articles. On the other hand, the House’s power to determine the scope of articles allows
it to craft grounds for impeachment that either place the Senate under great political pressure to
convict, or that render it difficult to convict but politically costly to acquit. The House, in this way, has
the power to create tensions between legal and political imperatives for the Senate. The agenda-control
regime over impeachment, in other words, has complex distributive effects as between the two
chambers of Congress.
83. The Constitution requires as much. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2 (“Each House may
determine the Rules of its Proceedings . . . .”).
84. Cf. Vermeule, supra note 11, at 362 (“Methodologically, it is impossible to talk fruitfully
about the design of constitutional rules if everything is up for grabs all at once . . . .”). For an analysis
of congressional procedures though a social choice theory lens, see Saul Levmore, Parliamentary
Law, Majority Decision Making, and the Voting Paradox, 75 VA. L. REV. 971 (1989) [hereinafter
Levmore, Parliamentary Law].
85. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1 (“All Bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of
Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with Amendments as on other Bills.”).
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clause, which describes a sequence of lawmaking involving two-chamber
passage, presidential consideration and veto, and a supermajoritarian override
procedure.86 While neither the second chamber nor the President directly
determines the metes and bounds of a legislative proposal, their exercise of a
“veto power”87 necessarily shapes the contents of threshold bill proposals: the
proposing chamber seeking to enact a law will shape it to the expected
preferences of subsequent veto players.88 Divergences in the preferences of the
pivotal institutional actors impede enactment of any new law,89 narrowing the
space of enactable legislative proposals.
This basic structure of legislative choice in the federal government
embodies a complex, Burkian solution to social choice problems. Three design
choices are worth isolating and analyzing as forms of agenda control embedded
within the constitutional text and jurisprudence. Attention to the agenda-control
function of these elements of the Constitution sheds light on consequences and
internal conflicts that would otherwise go unobserved.
1. Bicameralism and Presentment
It is useful to begin with the most facially prominent agenda-control
element of Article I: the requirement that the House, the Senate, and the
President (almost always) concur on a bill before it becomes law. By requiring
concurrence from several veto players across both chambers and the
presidency, bicameralism and presentment dramatically narrow the domain of
plausible legislative proposals.90 That space, in expectation, will be smaller
than the space of passable policy preferences turning on either a pair’s or a
single actor’s preferences.
This choice-constraining effect mitigates Arrovian instability. In an
influential treatment of structure-induced equilibrium, Shepsle and Weingast
observed that “institutional restrictions on the domain of exchange [can] induce
stability,” albeit at the cost of violating Arrow’s unrestricted domain

86.
87.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
CHARLES M. CAMERON, VETO BARGAINING: PRESIDENTS AND THE POLITICS OF
NEGATIVE POWER 46 (2000).
88. Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 11, at 529–33 (modeling bicameralism and presentment
as a sequential game with perfect information). For a similar model under the label of “pivotal
politics,” see KEITH KREHBIEL, PIVOTAL POLITICS: A THEORY OF LAWMAKING 21–28 (1998).
89. Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 11, at 532 (“The Framers expected the House, Senate,
and President to have widely dispersed preferences about the status quo, and therefore the no-statute
game (Case 2) was most likely in the short term.”).
90. This is prior, indeed, to the introduction of congressional committees and judicial review
into the model—new features that reduce the domain of plausible enactments even further. Id. at 539,
548–51. For the sake of expositional clarity, moreover, I omit the further complication that discussion
of the House or Senate as a unitary actor is misleading: given the procedural rules of each chamber and
the power exercised by party leaders, the preferences of the median legislator will not necessarily be
pivotal to that body’s endorsement.
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condition.91 The set of options resulting from bicameralism and presentment is
likely to be “value-restricted” (i.e., there is some option never ranked as either
best, worst, or medium by any veto player) and thus coherent.92 The structure
of veto-gates in the legislative process, in short, diminishes the risk of
uncertainty by easing one of the four Arrovian criteria (unrestricted domain). It
does so, moreover, without making the House, the Senate, or the President a
“dictator” in the sense of having unfettered, or largely unfettered, control over
the shape of legislative outputs. To the contrary, bicameralism may diffuse the
authority to set the legislative agenda since “one chamber’s agenda setter will
be at the mercy of the order of consideration in the other chamber.”93 The
bicameralism element of Article I, in short, combines with presentment to solve
a social choice problem, but at the same time that it works to advance another
central goal of the Constitution’s separation of powers—the diffusion of
political power between different elected bodies.94
Nevertheless, design solutions often have costs. The concurrence demands
of bicameralism and presentment are no exception. It is well known that plural
veto-gates “often” yield gridlock.95 Gridlock, in turn, constitutes a heavy thumb
on the scale in favor of the status quo.96 This is normatively attractive if new
lawmaking is presumptively suspect and the status quo ante to lawmaking
always desirable.
For example, if the background to federal legislation were a just
prepolitical distribution of property rights at risk of inequitable corruption by
meddling legislative majorities,97 a structure-induced equilibrium that favored
the status quo might well be normatively desirable. Such a presumption about
the baseline distribution of property entitlements, however imaginable at the

91. Shepsle & Weingast, supra note 67, at 507 (emphasis omitted).
92. SEN, COLLECTIVE CHOICE, supra note 14, at 166–86.
93. Saul Levmore, Bicameralism: When Are Two Decisions Better than One?, 12 INT’L REV.
L. & ECON. 145, 147 (1992) [hereinafter Levmore, Bicameralism].
94. For a typical statement to this effect see, for example, Thomas W. Merrill, The
Constitutional Principle of Separation of Powers, 1991 SUP. CT. REV. 225, 252 (positing that “the
central end of a system of separation of powers [is] the diffusion of power to ‘protect the liberty and
security of the governed’”) (citation omitted).
95. KREHBIEL, supra note 88, at 38–39 (developing the prediction that gridlock “occurs, and
occurs often” under a pivotal politics model).
96. Josh Chafetz, The Phenomenology of Gridlock, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2065, 2077
(2013) (“Gridlock is simply the perpetuation of the status quo; it is inertial.”).
97. For a defense of Article 1, Section 7 that seems to rest on these grounds, see David G.
Savage, Justice Scalia: Americans ‘Should Learn to Love Gridlock,’ L.A. TIMES (Oct. 5, 2011),
http://articles.latimes.com/2011/oct/05/news/la-pn-scalia-testifies-20111005 [https://perma.cc/7WZSUTB9] (“Americans ‘should learn to love gridlock’ . . . . ‘The framers (of the Constitution) would say,
yes, “That’s exactly the way we set it up. We wanted power contradicting power (to prevent) an excess
of legislation.”’” (quoting Justice Scalia)); see also William T. Mayton, The Possibilities of Collective
Choice: Arrow’s Theorem, Article I, and the Delegation of Legislative Power to Administrative
Agencies, 1986 DUKE L.J. 948, 958 (“Article I does not regard a private ordering of society as
inviolate. It does, however, require that defects in this ordering, and a remedy for them, be carefully
identified before government upsets it.”).

2016]

THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF AGENDA CONTROL

1423

time of the founding, is plainly implausible now.98 The status quo that
contemporary legislative coalitions stand to displace is not a tabla rasa. It is
rather a complex accumulation of previous legislation, agency interpretations,
presidential unilateralism, and unexpected interactions between the multiplicity
of regulatory regimes found in the U.S. Code and state statute books.99 Thus,
the status quo that bicameralism and presentment shields might embody
background distributions of individual entitlements, the outcomes of long and
unintended policy drift, or even executive branch adventurism.100 A bias in
favor of such a baseline has only a thin intrinsic normative justification.101
This agenda-control structure has motivated legal disputes when Congress
has tried to require the concurrence of additional actors. The Supreme Court,
however, has resisted some deviations from the “finely wrought” pathway of
Article I, Section 7.102 In the mid-1980s and 1990s, the Court invalidated three
different legislative efforts to supplement Article I, Section 7: (1) a legislative
veto exercised by a subset of Congress;103 (2) a budgetary instrument designed
to mechanically trim deficit spending via automatic fiscal “haircuts”;104 and (3)
a presidential line-item veto again designed to keep budgets in check.105 In
each of these cases, the Court read the text of the Constitution to establish “a
single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered, procedure.”106
The Court’s text-based argument in favor of exclusivity in these cases,
however, is unpersuasive. To begin with, notice that in many other instances
the Court has declined to read the Constitution’s text as exhaustive in a similar
fashion. Immediately obvious examples are the application of the First
98. The founding-era push for constraints on governmental power, particularly in relation to
taxation and spending, however, was rooted in a desire to protect slavery. ROBIN L. EINHORN,
AMERICAN TAXATION, AMERICAN SLAVERY 117–58 (2008). That resistance may be defensible on
independent grounds, but it is hardly clear that we can rely on the Framers’ preferences on the size of
government as obviously normatively salient.
99. The effect is complicated by Congress’s use of sunset provisions, which can lead to
changes in the status quo absent congressional action. See Emily Berman, The Paradox of
Counterterrorism Sunset Provisions, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1777, 1832–34 (2013) (canvassing use of
sunset provisions). In one case, the Constitution itself imposes a sunset rule in respect to military
expenditures. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12 (noting the two-year limit on military appropriations).
100. See Michael J. Teter, Gridlock, Legislative Supremacy, and the Problem of Arbitrary
Inaction, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2217, 2220 (2013) (describing the baseline preserved by gridlock
as “arbitrary”).
101. There is also a rather pessimistic theoretical literature that suggests bicameralism will
generate results not originally manifested in either chamber, that are not Condorcet choices, and that
may not be Pareto optimal. See Donald R. Gross, Bicameralism and the Theory of Voting, 35 W. POL.
Q. 511, 512 (1982). Other literature suggests bicameralism produces complex patterns of strategic
voting. See Simon Hug, Strategic Voting in a Bicameral Setting, 16 STUD. PUB. CHOICE 231, 231–32
(2010).
102. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983). It is important to note that the Court has not
uniformly resisted such deviations.
103. Id.
104. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 733–34 (1986).
105. Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 439–40 (1998).
106. Id. (citing Chadha, 462 U.S. at 951); see also Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 734.
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Amendment to executive as well as legislative action and the efflorescence of
state sovereign immunity doctrines. Further, the “perception of [textual] clarity
or ambiguity is itself often affected by interpretive considerations that are
commonly thought to be extra-textual . . . [and] is partly constructed in
American interpretive practice.”107 To conclude that a legal text should be read
as exclusive or exemplary, one needs some other evidence, whether gleaned
from structure, history, or a prior understanding of the text’s purpose. The
Court’s precedent treating Article I, Section 7 as exclusive begs the question
whether the normative justifications for bicameralism and presentment justify
that result—a question I return to in Part III.
2. Bespoke Starting Rules for Legislation
A second sort of solution to social choice dynamics concerns the power to
start certain kinds of legislative process as opposed to the series of required
concurrence from various actors. Three elements of Article 1, Section 7 bear
this function.
First, Article 1, Section 7 makes the House the first mover on “[a]ll Bills
for raising revenue”108 as a means of vesting the power of the purse with the
more popular branch of the legislature.109 That clause also preserves the
Senate’s power “to propose or concur with Amendments as on other Bills.”110
The primary method of enforcing the Origination Clause is the House’s “blue
slip” procedure for returning Senate-passed revenue bills to the other
chamber.111 Judicial enforcement is available, but rarely invoked.112 The Court
has permitted the Senate to exercise an expansive amendment power by
suggesting that the judiciary lacks power “to determine whether the amendment
was or was not outside the purposes of the original bill.”113 This construction of
the Senate’s authority is consonant with debates at the Philadelphia
Convention, during which delegates considered and rejected the longstanding
English rule that would have rendered a lower chamber’s fiscal proposals
amendment-proof.114
107. Curtis A. Bradley & Neil S. Siegel, Constructed Constraint and the Constitutional Text, 64
DUKE L.J. 1213, 1238 (2015).
108. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1.
109. See Kysar, Shell Bill, supra note 11, at 666 (“Delegates . . . used democratic principles to
justify the Origination Clause, which gave control over initiating revenue matters to the directly
elected House of Representatives, rather than the Senate whose members were elected by state
legislatures.”).
110. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1.
111. House Rule IX, cl. 2(a)(1) (setting forth blue slip procedure).
112. The leading case is United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 394 (1990), but it has
produced few progeny. Earlier cases established that a bill is not covered by the Origination Clause,
unless the resulting funds were deposited in the general Treasury fund. See, e.g., Millard v. Roberts,
202 U.S. 429, 436–37 (1906).
113. Rainey v. United States, 232 U.S. 310, 317 (1914); accord Flint v. Stone Tracey Co., 220
U.S. 107, 143 (1911).
114. Kysar, Shell Bill, supra note 11, at 665–71.
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Second, in contrast to the Origination Clause, the starting power for
treaties resides in the President.115 Only the President can negotiate with
another sovereign nation; indeed, only the President can formally communicate
with another nation for the purpose of entering into a treaty.116
Third, and perhaps least noticed, the veto override provision in Article 1,
Section 7, Clause 2, also contains a starting rule. It requires that “the House in
which [a bill] shall have originated” vote first on a veto override.117 This role
has entered constitutional law only obliquely as a means of glossing a separate
constitutional rule. In the Supreme Court’s 1929 Pocket Veto Case, the Court
relied on the fact that “the House in which the bill originated is not in session”
to construe the President’s pocket veto authority in relatively capacious
terms.118
At first blush, these three starting rules seem to allocate significant agenda
control. Without the consent of a relevant gatekeeper, it would seem, no
proposal can even embark on its legislative voyage let alone reach safe anchor
in the U.S. Code. Whether these provisions have indeed had such a decisive
effect is a question I take up in Part III.
3. The Equilibrating Role of Political Parties
A final source of structure-induced equilibrium in legislative outcomes
can be rooted in constitutional jurisprudence, but not constitutional text. At
least formally, Article I neither restricts the range of proposals that can be
introduced within the congressional process nor elicits any particular pattern of
voting.119 Nevertheless, congressional preferences are distributed in a
monotonic (i.e., a single-peaked) pattern. Empirical studies of the second half
of the twentieth-century find that a single dimension of ideological difference
explains more than 85 percent of congressional voting.120 Polarization along

115. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
116. Oona A. Hathaway, Presidential Power over International Law: Restoring the Balance,
119 YALE L.J. 140, 207 (2009) (“The President possesses unilateral power to negotiate an agreement
with a foreign party.”).
117. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
118. 279 U.S. 655, 683 (1929). Petitioners in that case argued for a narrow reading of
adjournment that encompassed only “the final adjournment of the Congress.” Id. at 674. The Court
seemed to be influenced by the specificity of the sequencing rule in reading “Adjournment” broadly.
Id. at 683–84. The same result logically, though, might have obtained without a reference to specific
chamber that had to act first in a veto override.
119. In the antebellum period, Congress used its power to set internal rules of procedure to limit
the domain of policy questions—imposing a “gag” rule on abolitionist proposals—in order to preclude
instability both in the Arrovian and the more colloquial sense. DON E. FEHRENBACHER, SLAVERY,
LAW, AND POLITICS 58 (1981).
120. See Keith T. Poole & R. Steven Daniels, Ideology, Party, and Voting in the U.S. Congress,
1959-1980, 79 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 373, 397 (1985); Keith T. Poole & Howard Rosenthal, A Spatial
Model for Legislative Roll Call Analysis, 29 AM. J. POL. SCI. 357, 368 (1985).
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this axis has increased since 2000.121 Monotonicity in Congress reduces the
likelihood of cycling but does not eliminate it entirely.122
The existence of monotonic congressional preferences suggests that the
search for legislative stability can be usefully extended before the proposal of a
bill in the House or Senate.123 One plausible source of monotonicity in
congressional preferences (as distinct from the general public’s preferences) is
the structure of the national party system.124 A two-party system tends to
produce policy debates with a binary structure. The existence of only two
parties, rather than the more crowded party systems observed in other
democracies, flows in turn from two elements of the constitutional
dispensation.
First, it is a function of a single-district electoral framework since the
founding. Famously, Duverger’s Law predicts that a simple-majority, singleballot electoral system is very likely to produce a binary party system. 125 But
this framework is only partly a constitutional choice. At the federal level, it is
necessitated solely in the post–Seventeenth Amendment Senate.126
Notwithstanding its longstanding use, it is not required for the House of
Representatives, which—except in states with only one congressional district—
can be elected via multimember districts.127
Second, notwithstanding the flexibility embedded in constitutional
districting rules, the Court has identified the preservation of a two-party system
as a state interest that licenses onerous restrictions on third parties’ access to
the ballot.128 The Court relied here, in a markedly circular fashion, on a worry
121. See NOLAN MCCARTY, KEITH T. POOLE & HOWARD ROSENTHAL, POLARIZED AMERICA:
THE DANCE OF IDEOLOGY AND UNEQUAL RICHES 15–70 (2006).
122. See Elizabeth Maggie Penn, John W. Patty & Sean Gailmard, Manipulation and SinglePeakedness: A General Result, 55 AM. J. POL. SCI. 436, 436–37 (2011).
123. Parties are not the sole nonstate actors salient to national agenda creation. The national
broadcast and news media—who, like political parties, are central objects of First Amendment
solicitude—are pivotal actors in calibrating the national agenda. Unlike parties, though, they are “a
major source of instability,” whose contributions conduce to “surges” and “lurch[es]” in policy focus.
BAUMGARTNER & JONES, supra note 12, at 103, 125.
124. See Levmore, Parliamentary Law, supra note 84, at 980; Grofman, supra note 62, at 1554
(“A two-party system creates a largely single-dimensional competition within the legislature.”). It is
worth stressing that what requires explanation here is the distribution of congressional preferences, not
popular preferences. That is, the public may or may not have monotonic preferences. Provided the
constitutional system of representation translates those views into a monotonic array of legislative
preferences, cycling will be dampened.
125. MAURICE DUVERGER, POLITICAL PARTIES: THEIR ORGANIZATION AND ACTIVITY IN THE
MODERN STATE 216–28 (Barbara & Robert North trans., Methuen 1954) (1951) (proposing that a
simple majority electoral system strongly favors a two-party status quo).
126. U.S. CONST. amend. XVII.
127. For judicial consideration of multimember congressional districts, see, for example, White
v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 765 (1973) (multimember districts not necessarily unconstitutional); accord
Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 159–61 (1971).
128. See, e.g., Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 367 (1997) (“[T]he
States’ interest [in political stability] permits them to enact reasonable election regulations that may, in
practice, favor the traditional two-party system.”).
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about “party-splintering and excessive factionalism,”129 and has been subject to
much criticism as a result.130
The Court, in contrast, missed a chance to justify its protection of the
national two-party systems by pointing to the party duopoly’s tendency to
induce monotonic legislative preferences.131 Stability of a social choice flavor,
therefore, might be invoked to underwrite constitutional solicitude for the twoparty system. That stability, moreover, may not emerge if alternative modalities
of political choice were adopted in lieu of a two-party duopoly.
In response, the critics of the party duopoly’s constitutional status might
point to the interaction between the party system and bicameralism. During
periods of interparty polarization, where the gap between the median member
of each party is large, it will be much more difficult to locate legislation that
can survive every veto-gate created by Article I, Section 7. Over the past three
decades, legislative inaction has increased in lockstep with increasing party
polarization.132 Stalemate, that is, flows from the interaction of two stabilityinducing structures: our two-party duopoly characterized by ideologically
distinct options and the thicket of concurrence rules populating Article I,
Section 7. These interactions, which conduce to a supernumerary degree of
stability, may well justify loosening either one of the two design margins.
Although my focus here is on separation of powers, it is worth noting that
the choice between party-based and popular agenda-control instruments also
arises at the state level, in part because institutional experimentation is more
readily feasible there than at the federal level. Among the states, the popular
initiative process has been used as a workaround of an entrenched party
system.133 Whether this workaround has proved successful is the object of
debate.134 Most recently, the choice between party-based and popular agenda
129. Id. at 367.
130. See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, Entrenching the Duopoly: Why the Supreme Court Should Not
Allow the States to Protect the Democrats and Republicans from Political Competition, 1997 SUP. CT.
REV. 331, 342–44.
131. Duopolies, notwithstanding the criticism to which they have been subject, are perhaps
preferable to other instruments for limiting the domain of expressed political preferences. See, e.g.,
David Levi, The Statistical Basis of Athenian-American Constitutional Theory, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 79,
887–89 (1989) (positing the classical Athenian practice of ostracism as a method of restricting
domain).
132. SARAH BINDER, BROOKINGS INST., POLARIZED WE GOVERN? 10 fig.3 (2014),
https://www.brookings.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2016/06/BrookingsCEPM_Polarized_figReplacedText
RevTableRev.pdf [https://perma.cc/B9PY-JXKV]; see also SARAH A. BINDER, STALEMATE: CAUSES
AND CONSEQUENCES OF LEGISLATIVE GRIDLOCK 41 (2003) (reporting an earlier round of findings on
stalemates).
133. THOMAS E. CRONIN, DIRECT DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICS OF INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM,
AND RECALL 2–6 (1989).
134. Because access to the initiative process depends largely on fiscal resources needed to
organize the necessary signature campaigns, it is thus quite possible to imagine strategic agenda
manipulation and cycling among proponents of different initiatives. See generally Elizabeth Garrett,
Money, Agenda Setting, and Direct Democracy, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1845, 1850–51, 1862 (1999)
(exploring signature thresholds and other fiscal barriers to entry in the initiative process).
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control was squarely at stake in Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona
Independent Redistricting Commission (AIRC), which formally concerned
Arizona’s allocation of redistricting authority to an independent commission.135
That commission was formed to “en[d] the practice of gerrymandering and
improv[e] voter and candidate participation in elections” by moving the starting
power in redistricting matters out of legislative hands into putatively more
independent hands.136 AIRC illustrates how agenda control can emerge in the
context of federalism because the Constitutional distinguishes between
different institutions within a state.
C. Agenda Control and the Executive Branch
This Section first explores two ways in which the Constitution parcels out
agenda control between Articles I and II, in regard first to policy making and
second to appointments. To illustrate the utility of an agenda-control lens, I
then analyze internal executive branch organization, especially the creation of
multimember agencies, in terms of agenda-control problematics.
1. Starting Rules and the Executive
In most domains where the Constitution divides authority between the
executive and Congress, Congress has the “exclusive” starting power as a
matter of course.137 As Justice Black stated in his Youngstown plurality
opinion, “[i]n the framework of our Constitution, the President’s power to see
that the laws are faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is to be a
lawmaker.”138 The temporal “primacy of the Article I lawmaking process”139
over executive action is implicit in Article II’s command that the President
“take care that the laws be faithfully executed.”140 Youngstown itself, which is a
bedrock of contemporary separation of powers jurisprudence, is often taken to
stand for the proposition that “the President not only cannot act contra legem,
he or she must point to affirmative legislative authorization when so acting.”141
Congress’s formal starting power is underscored and reinforced in three
different ways in the Constitutional text and case law. First, specific elements
135. 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2658–59 (2015) (holding that Article I, Section 4, Clause 1 does not bar
congressional redistricting by an independent commission).
136. Id. at 2661.
137. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 588 (1952) (Black, J., plurality
opinion); Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2319 (2001) (“Basic
separation of powers doctrine maintains that Congress must authorize presidential exercises of
essentially lawmaking functions.”). The creation of treaties, noted above, is an exception.
138. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 588–89 (noting “exclusive constitutional authority to make laws
necessary and proper to carry out the powers vested by the Constitution”).
139. Stuart Minor Benjamin & Ernest A. Young, Tennis with the Net Down: Administrative
Federalism Without Congress, 57 DUKE L.J. 2111, 2134 (2008).
140. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
141. Henry P. Monaghan, The Protective Power of the Presidency, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 10
(1993).
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of the Constitution’s text reiterate the primacy of congressional action. The
Declare War Clause,142 for example, appears to repose in Congress the power
to initiate armed hostilities and then to regulate comprehensively their
execution143 (although it is generally believed that the Framers intended the
presidency to have power to “repel sudden attacks” on its own initiative).144
Notwithstanding this exception, there is “no mistaking . . . the Constitution’s
broad textual commitment to Congress’s key role in the war-making
system.”145
Second, the Court has developed lines of jurisprudence to preserve
legislative primacy in determining the content of federal policy. The more
successful judicial intervention—perhaps so successful that it has now been
largely forgotten—concerns criminal law. Article I does not mention a specific
congressional power to criminalize quotidian matters.146 Nevertheless, it seems
self-evident to us now that the federal government has the power to impose
criminal punishment, and yet that the executive has no power to initiate a
criminal prosecution without legislative authority. At the time of the founding,
however, a federal prosecutor or judge could rely on a common law of
crimes.147 The executive’s ability to rely on a repository of common law
offenses invested it with a sort of starting power with respect to the criminal
law. It was not until 1812 that the Supreme Court rejected that inheritance of
common law criminal offenses from colonial practice.148 Extinguishing the
federal common law of substantive crimes in effect restored starting power to
Congress, depriving the executive of the power to take the initiative.

142. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11 (“The Congress shall have Power to . . . declare War . . . .”).
143. Although there is some controversy on this point, the best historical accounts stress the
pervasive extent of congressional authority. See David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The
Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb—A Constitutional History, 121 HARV. L. REV. 941, 947
(2008) (“Congress has been an active participant in setting the terms of battle . . . .”); Saikrishna
Bangalore Prakash, The Sweeping Domestic War Powers of Congress, 113 MICH. L. REV. 1337, 1340
(2015) (making a “case for expansive congressional power” in respect to “domestic wars”).
144. See JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at
475–77 (W. W. Norton & Co. 1966) (1840); see also Raoul Berger, War-Making by the President,
121 U. PA. L. REV. 29, 40–43 (1972) (analyzing those debates).
145. Bruce Ackerman & Oona Hathaway, Limited War and the Constitution: Iraq and the
Crisis of Presidential Legality, 109 MICH. L. REV. 447, 453 (2011).
146. Indeed, a committed textualist ought to infer the opposite result. The Constitution assigns
Congress power to “define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and offenses
against the law of nations.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10. Reading Article I as exclusive—as the Court
has done in Chadha, Bowsher, and like jurisprudence—leads to the conclusion that the federal
government has no power to criminalize.
147. That common law of crime was recognized in eight federal circuits in the 1790s. See Gary
D. Rowe, The Sound of Silence: United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, the Jeffersonian Ascendancy,
and the Abolition of Federal Common Law Crimes, 101 YALE L.J. 919, 920 n.8 (1992) (collecting
cases); see also Kathryn Preyer, Jurisdiction to Punish: Federal Authority, Federalism and the
Common Law of Crimes in the Early Republic, 4 L. & HIST. REV. 223, 263–64 (1986) (mapping
debates about the federal common law of crime).
148. United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. 32, 33 (1812).
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Finally, robust protection of Congress’s power to initiate domestic policy
implies careful policing of the boundary between enforcing an enacted statute
and using that statute as a springboard for independent policymaking. An
“intelligible principle” from Congress was, and technically still is, required to
guide any exercise of executive branch discretion.149 The extent of
congressional agenda control rises and falls in inverse proportion to the
enforcement—or, as explored further below, nonenforcement150—of that
specification demand. Among its other effects, failure to enforce a
nondelegation rule in an era of broad agency rulemaking authority would mean
that the status quo, sheltered by bicameralism and presentment,151 is more
likely to be comprised of Article II–calibrated norms.
Even when the Court recognizes a domain of threshold executive-branch
authority, it also stresses residual pathways for congressional control. For
example, describing the exclusive presidential power to recognize foreign
sovereigns in Zivotofsky v. Kerry—in effect, an allocation of starting power to
the President rather than Congress—the Court cautioned that it did “not
question the substantial powers of Congress over foreign affairs in general or
passports in particular.”152 Hence, it seems that the Constitution generally
requires the legislative branch of Article I to be the first mover.153
2. Appointments as a Form of Agenda Control
Once Congress enacts a regulatory statute, the manner in which the
executive enforces that law often turns on decisions by federal agencies’
leadership. The instrument for appointing senior officials to those agencies,
therefore, acts as a subsequent opportunity to influence the federal policy
agenda. Political leaders can recalibrate agency enforcement efforts by
alternating between either zealous or reluctant agency heads. Appointments to

149. J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928). For a contemporary
application, see Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 474 (2001) (rejecting a
nondelegation challenge under the intelligible principle rule).
150. See infra text accompanying notes 213–216.
151. See supra text accompanying notes 90–101.
152. 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2096 (2015); see also id. at 2090 (“For it is Congress that makes laws,
and in countless ways its laws will and should shape the Nation’s course. The Executive is not free
from the ordinary controls and checks of Congress merely because foreign affairs are at issue.”).
153. An exception is Dames & Moore v. Regan, in which the Court could point to no law that
authorized its dismissal of private contract claims pending in U.S. courts against Iran. 453 U.S. 654,
686–87 (1981). Professors John Manning and Jack Goldsmith argue more generally that the President
has “a discretion that is neither dictated nor meaningfully channeled by legislative command.” Jack
Goldsmith & John F. Manning, The President’s Completion Power, 115 YALE L.J. 2280, 2308 (2006).
Most of their examples—rulemaking, prosecutorial discrimination in the criminal context, and
deference to agency interpretations of regulatory statutes—arise within the four corners of a legislative
authorization, and so are strained and inapposite of the claimed completion power.
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federal agencies, therefore, provide a second agenda-control instrument in the
regulatory domain after the enactment of a statute.154
The constitutional scheme for appointments of both officials and federal
judges is “a mirror image” of the default rule in other settings. “Whereas
Article I empowers the Congress to set the legislative agenda, the
Appointments Clause grants agenda-setting power to the president on
appointments matters.”155 Indeed, Article II vests presidents with indefeasible
control over the selection of “principal officers” subject to possible rejection by
the Senate.156 Article II further grants the President power to make “recess”
appointments without a Senate vote.157 One study of appointments to twelve
agencies between 1945 and 2000 found that 12 percent were made without
Senate advice and consent, with Presidents Eisenhower, Truman, and Reagan
using this tactic most frequently.158
In its recent decision in NLRB v. Canning, the Court ruled that the
President’s power extended to all breaks in legislative proceedings more than
three days in length, without regard to when the vacancy first arose.159
Although some commentators have characterized Canning as a “broad”
construction of presidential power,160 the ultimate effect of the opinion likely
hinges on the Senate’s willingness to recess in ways that trigger the presidential
appointment power. Nevertheless, it is plausible to generalize to the effect that
the President has starting power in respect to most important federal
appointments.
3. The Design of Federal Agencies
Arrow’s Theorem and its successors suggest that instability will be
limited to the plural branches—Congress and the federal judiciary—while the

154. The appointments power is only one of a series of instruments possessed by the President
for influencing regulatory outcomes. Aziz Z. Huq, Removal as a Political Question, 65 STAN. L. REV.
1, 25–33 (2013) (canvassing those instruments). It is, however, the only one that the Constitution’s text
identifies.
155. Michael J. Gerhardt, Toward a Comprehensive Understanding of the Federal
Appointments Process, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 467, 481 (1998).
156. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 133–37 (1976) (per curiam)
(describing effect of Appointments Clause and holding that Congress cannot appoint officers).
157. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3.
158. Pamela C. Corley, Avoiding Advice and Consent: Recess Appointments and Presidential
Power, 36 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 670, 676 (2006).
159. 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2558–73 (2014) (describing a relatively broad account of the Recess
Appointment power).
160. Michael B. Rappaport, Why Non-Originalism Does Not Justify Departing from the
Original Meaning of the Recess Appointments Clause, 38 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 889, 892 (2015)
(“When combined with the broad view as to when a vacancy happens, this interpretation allows the
President to make a recess appointment for any vacant office during the six to ten legislative breaks of
ten days or more that typically occur each year.”).
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“unitary executive”161 will evade its perils. If allocating decisions to the
executive obviated the trade-offs identified in social choice theory, then this
might provide a powerful reason for allocating larger authority to Article II
rather than to Article I or Article III. Indeed, it is certainly true that the
hierarchical structure of an executive branch capped with a singular chief
provides at least one putatively instability-proof channel for policy choice.162
But not all decision making in the executive branch is channeled through a
singular vessel. Article II provides no safe harbor from instability.
There are two reasons to believe instability is a more substantial
possibility in executive branch decision making than is commonly realized.
First, the Constitution does not assume that the President will shoulder the task
of translating law into policy on his or her own. The Opinions Clause of Article
II, to the contrary, assumes a multiplicity of “departments” in a hierarchical
relationship with the President.163 Many important decisions taken by the
executive branch implicate different agencies and are reached through either
formal or “informal and relatively invisible” processes of negotiation and
accommodation.164 Some statutes contain what Jody Freeman and Jim Rossi
call “concurrence requirements” that make interagency agreement a
prerequisite of regulatory intervention,165 much as Article I requires the
concurrence of several elected bodies before a proposal becomes law.
Even without a formal interagency process, the regulatory process creates
many opportunities for instability to enter executive decision making. Part of
the Office of Information and Regulatory Affair’s function, for instance, is to
161. The unitary executive theory of Article II of the Constitution holds that the President must
have “the power to supervise and control all subordinate executive officials exercising executive
power conferred explicitly by either the Constitution or a valid statute.” Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin
H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV.
1153, 1177 n.119 (1992). Were the unitary executive theory to hold in practice (which even its
proponents do not claim), it might stifle some, but not all, institutional features that conduce to
instability in decision making within the executive. Cf. Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash,
The President’s Power to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 582 (1994) (setting forth implications
of the theory for independent agencies).
162. Quantitative studies of presidential control of regulatory agencies, however, have
identified plurality even in White House influences. See Lisa Schultz Bressman & Michael P.
Vandenbergh, Inside the Administrative State: A Critical Look at the Practice of Presidential Control,
105 MICH. L. REV. 47, 49 (2006) (“Presidential control is a ‘they,’ not an ‘it.’” (citation omitted)).
163. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (empowering the President to “require the Opinion, in writing,
of the principal Officer in each of the executive Departments, upon any subject relating to the Duties
of their respective Offices”).
164. J. R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, Public Agencies as Lobbyists, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 2217,
2232 (2005) (claiming that “[a] great deal of interagency communication occurs in the administrative
state”). A weaker form of collective choice has been identified in the adjudicative context. See Bijal
Shah, Uncovering Coordinated Interagency Adjudication, 128 HARV. L. REV. 805, 813 (2015)
(“Resolving administrative claims often involves interagency coordination throughout the process.
Agencies coordinate throughout their investigations and claim development by sharing both facts and
legal analyses with one another.”).
165. Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space, 125 HARV.
L. REV. 1131, 1160–61 (2012).
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manage “a genuinely interagency process.”166 Whenever this entails more than
two agencies debating over more than two possible policy choices, there is a
collective choice that must be reached through some decision rule—a decision
rule that risks instability and incoherence.
Second, the design of post–New Deal regulatory agencies has often been
motivated by a concern that the agency will bend to the influence of “wellfinanced and politically influential special interests.”167 One of the agency
design choices thought to hinder “capture” is multiplicity. There are by one
recent count forty-three federal agencies captained by multimember boards.168
The plural structure of these agencies’ leadership means their decisions are
vulnerable to the incoherence and instability dynamics identified in the social
choice literature. It is also worth noting that about half of these multimember
boards are statutorily required to show “partisan balance” in their
composition.169 This means that these boards tend to have more heterogeneous
preferences than might otherwise be anticipated,170 which means they have a
less restricted domain of choices; as a result, they will tend to be less stable.171
The choice between such multimember boards and single-headed agencies,
therefore, implicates a trade-off between the risk of interest-group capture and
the risk of instability or paralysis.
In summary, problems of agenda control are endemic across the federal
government. Article II’s unitary nature supplies no escape route from the tradeoffs presented by social choice theory.
D. Agenda Control and the Judiciary
A multimember national judiciary, like a plural legislature, faces both the
problem of selecting the right questions to address, and then the difficulty of

166. Cass R. Sunstein, The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs: Myths and Realities,
126 HARV. L. REV. 1838, 1841 (2013).
167. Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional Design,
89 TEX. L. REV. 15, 17 (2010); see also Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight
of the Regulatory State, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1260, 1285 (2006) (“[More recent explanations of
agency capture] look to how agencies cooperate with interest groups in order to procure needed
information, political support, and guidance; the more one-sided that information, support, and
guidance, the more likely that agencies will act favorably toward the dominant interest group.”).
168. Kirti Datla & Richard L. Revesz, Deconstructing Independent Agencies (and Executive
Agencies), 98 CORNELL L. REV. 769, 793 (2013).
169. Id. at 797–99; see also Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr. et al., Partisan Balance Requirements
in the Age of New Formalism, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 941, 962–72 (2015) (tracing the historical
usage of partisan balance requirements back to the 1862 Utah Commission).
170. For a celebration of this characteristic that fails to note the effect of decisional stability, see
Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110 YALE L.J. 71, 103 (2000)
(“An independent agency that is all Democratic, or all Republican, might polarize toward an extreme
position . . . . A requirement of bipartisan membership can operate as a check against movements of
this kind.”).
171. To the best I can tell, the only scholar to apply social choice theory in this context is
Mayton, supra note 97, at 961–62.
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overcoming Arrovian instability in the decision-making processes. The
Constitution contains two agenda-control instruments for judicial action: first,
the congressional power to calibrate the scope of federal courts’ jurisdiction
and, second, the reticulated doctrine of standing that federal judges have
inferred from the text of Article III.
1. Jurisdictional Calibration as Agenda Control
Like the domain of potential objects subject to government regulation, the
universe of potential disputes amenable to federal court resolution is too large
to be compassed by the federal judiciary. Scarcity of adjudicative resources has
implications both for the settlement function of the U.S. Supreme Court and the
more retail dispute resolution service offered in district courts.
The Supreme Court is not centrally concerned with the resolution of
individuals’ disputes. Rather, it endeavors to resolve legal questions of wideranging importance.172 At the same time, the Court lacks the resources, and
perhaps the political support,173 to decide all significant constitutional
questions. In contrast, federal district courts are engaged in a distinct,
routinized resolution of granular individual disputes, the vast majority of which
lack national resonance. Yet, like the Supreme Court, federal district courts
cannot possibly handle all potentially justiciable disputes.174 Even in the
limited domain of constitutional disputes, the volume of routine government
actions that might violate due process or equal protection norms means that
lower courts need docket management tools to stanch a potentially
overwhelming flow of litigation.175

172. Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, 110
HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1385 (1997) (emphasizing the Supreme Court’s role “as the authoritative settler
of constitutional meaning”).
173. The leading empirical studies of the Court’s “diffuse” support find a reservoir of public
support that the Court can draw upon. See James L. Gibson, Gregory A. Caldeira & Lester Kenyatta
Spence, Measuring Attitudes Toward the United States Supreme Court, 47 AM. J. POL. SCI. 354, 355
(2003) (providing data on support of the Supreme Court from 1973 to 2000); see also Gregory A.
Caldeira, Neither the Purse nor the Sword: Dynamics of Public Confidence in the Supreme Court, 80
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1209, 1220–23 (1986) (charting confidence changes in the Court from the late
1960s to the early 1980s).
174. For an example of judicial awareness of this point, see Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731,
735 (2011) (“Courts should think carefully before expending scarce judicial resources to resolve
difficult and novel questions of constitutional or statutory interpretation that will have no effect on the
outcome of the case.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
175. The Supreme Court has recognized this volume problem most explicitly in the context of
constitutional tort litigation. See, e.g., Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 132 (1990) (stating that “the
random and unpredictable nature of [a] deprivation” makes predeprivation due process
impracticable”); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984) (extending Parratt’s exhaustion principle to
intentional torts). Arguably anxieties about docket management have shaped the landscape of
constitutional remedies more generally. See Aziz Z Huq, Judicial Independence and the Rationing of
Constitutional Remedies, 65 DUKE L.J. 1 (2015) [hereinafter Huq, Judicial Independence].
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As an initial matter, the Constitution reposes the power to shape the
judicial agenda in Congress’s hands.176 Congress has not only threshold
authority to determine whether lower courts exist at all177 but also ability to
carve “[e]xceptions, and . . . [r]egulations” to the appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court.178 Since its founding, Congress has modulated the extent of
lower court jurisdiction and the Supreme Court’s settlement authority in
response to changing social, political, and ideological demands.179 Since the
antebellum period, the Court has recognized broad congressional power over
lower-court jurisdiction.180
Regulation of the high court’s appellate jurisdiction triggers more heated
controversy.181 Today, the Supreme Court exercises almost complete
discretionary authority over appellate jurisdiction via the use of the certiorari
system. But it is easy to forget that certiorari was a congressional choice, one
that legislative hands can presumptively unravel.182 The constitutional
assignment of agenda control for the judiciary to the elected branches has
engendered much anxiety and hand wringing among scholars.183 Nevertheless,
in the absence of a definitive statement to the contrary from the Court it would
seem that the text of Article III to vests the legislature with tolerably broad

176. Extrapolating from discussions of the power of downstream veto-gates to influence earlier
participants’ strategic choices in a multistage decisional process, it might be posited that Congress also
influences the judiciary’s distribution of adjudicative resources via the threat of a legislative override.
Recent research concerning patterns of the Supreme Court certiorari grants between 1953 and 1993,
however, obtains a null result for that kind of anticipatory effect. Ryan J. Owens, The Separation of
Powers and Supreme Court Agenda Setting, 54 AM. J. POL. SCI. 412, 419–24 (2010). Hence,
Congress’s influence appears to be purely ex ante in operation.
177. James S. Liebman & William F. Ryan, “Some Effectual Power”: The Quantity and
Quality of Decisionmaking Required of Article III Courts, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 696, 715–18 (1998)
(describing how “the Madisonian Compromise, letting Congress decide whether to appoint inferior
tribunals” emerged at the Philadelphia convention).
178. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2. The Court’s original jurisdiction is sufficiently exiguous to
be of little practical significance.
179. For a detailed history of jurisdictional development in both the lower courts and the apex
tribunal, see generally JUSTIN CROWE, BUILDING THE JUDICIARY: LAW, COURTS, AND THE POLITICS
OF INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT (2012).
180. See, e.g., Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. 441, 448–49 (1850) (upholding the power of Congress to
restrict the scope of diversity jurisdiction). With a handful of exceptions, there is also an academic
consensus that “Congress has very broad power to limit the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts, as
long as the Supreme Court retains appellate jurisdiction over constitutional claims initially litigated in
state court.” Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Jurisdiction-Stripping Reconsidered, 96 VA. L. REV. 1043, 1093
(2010).
181. Gerald Gunther, Congressional Power to Curtail Federal Court Jurisdiction: An
Opinionated Guide to the Ongoing Debate, 36 STAN. L. REV. 895, 895–97 (1984) (documenting that
history).
182. Congress first reposed significant discretionary authority in the Court’s own hands over
the content of its appellate docket in the Evarts Act, Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 517, § 6, 26 Stat. 826,
828, a discretion expanded in later statutes, see, e.g., Act of Dec. 23, 1914, ch. 2, 38 Stat. 790;
Judiciary Act of 1925, Pub. L. No. 68-415, 43 Stat. 936.
183. Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An
Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1364–65 (1953).
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authority to determine which constitutional questions of national import end up
on the judiciary’s agenda.184
2. Justiciability Doctrine as Agenda Control
A second species of agenda control lies with the courts rather than
Congress. The Justices have authority to develop doctrine that selects litigants
in ways that shape the flow of issues presented later. I use the example of the
standing doctrine here, but a parallel point might be made with many other
judge-fashioned doctrines, including ripeness, mootness, abstention, and the
elaborate structures of state sovereign immunity that have emerged in recent
jurisprudence. The Supreme Court has read the words “case” and
“controversy” in Article III to limit the class of cognizable disputes. One
element of the ensuing body of justiciability doctrine concerns the standing of
plaintiffs to seek judicial redress.185
Standing’s central function is “ensuring that the people most directly
concerned are able to litigate the questions at issue.”186 In a pair of insightful
articles, Maxwell Stearns has adduced another, ingenious explanation for the
standing doctrine: these rules constitute a judicially fashioned source of
structure-induced equilibrium.187 A further inference from Stearns’s logic—the
use of stare decisis to limit the emergence of cycling by making the first
resolution of an issue presumptively conclusive, even when a majority might
exist to overturn it—provides another guarantor of stability in judicial
outcomes.
The potential for Arrovian instability arises whenever a multimember
body must select among more than two alternative rules: Arrow’s theorem
holds that a majority votes sequentially and pairwise for A over B, B over C,
and A over C.188 Absent some constraint on the reconsideration of A, a court
facing these alternatives can “continue to cycle indefinitely, leading to a

184. For a textual argument to this effect, see John Harrison, The Power of Congress to Limit
the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts and the Text of Article III, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 203, 204 (1997).
185. Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433, 445 (2009) (framing the “critical question [in standing
analysis as] whether at least one petitioner has alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to warrant his invocation of federal-court jurisdiction” (internal quotation marks and
emphasis omitted)).
186. William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 222 (1988). The black
letter law of standing is now calcified in the three-part test of injury-in-fact, causation, and
redressibility enunciated in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 576 (1992). See also
Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 497 (2009) (describing the tripartite Lujan test as a “hard
floor”).
187. Maxwell L. Stearns, Standing and Social Choice: Historical Evidence, 144 U. PA. L. REV.
309 (1995) [hereinafter Stearns, Historical Evidence]; Maxwell L. Stearns, Standing Back from the
Forest: Justiciability and Social Choice, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 1309 (1995) [hereinafter Stearns,
Justiciability].
188. For examples, see Stearns, Justiciability, supra note 187, at 1335–39 (providing an
example from standing doctrine).
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stalemate.”189 Alternatively, if previously defeated options are eliminated from
consideration by the doctrine of stare decisis, “the power to set the agenda,
meaning the power to determine the order in which options are presented for
voting” would be outcome dispositive.190
Courts are vulnerable to a second kind of instability called the doctrinal
paradox. This arises when a collective entity forms a judgment on a single
matter based on numerous subsidiary issues, but different ultimate results are
obtained by a single all-or-nothing vote.191
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals recently confronted a dispute in which
outcome voting and issue voting in an antitrust case would have resulted in
different results because three judges’ differing views on an antitrust standing
and an antitrust merits question.192 That case is unusual, perhaps, because of
the judges recognized the doctrinal paradox and provided cogent discussions of
how it should be resolved. In at least one other case, moreover, it is arguable
that a Justice (perhaps strategically) decided to switch in the high court from
outcome-based voting to issue-based voting for the purpose of influencing the
outcome of a case.193
Standing rules, Stearns argues, do not entirely extinguish instability in
multimember courts. Rather, those rules tether federal courthouse access to a
set of facts—captured under the rubric of injury-in-fact—largely outside the
control of individual litigants.194 Stearns characterizes the injury-in-fact
element of standing doctrine as “likely beyond” the reach of even the most
powerful interest groups seeking judicial ratification of a non-Condorcetwinner rule.195 According to Stearns, standing doctrine’s injury-in-fact rule

189. Id. at 1339.
190. Id. at 1340, 1347; id. at 1353 (describing the stabilizing role of stare decisis); see also id. at
1314–15 (same); Saul Levmore, Public Choice and Law’s Either/Or Inclination, 79 U. CHI. L. REV.
1663, 1663–64 (2012) (reviewing LEO KATZ, WHY THE LAW IS SO PERVERSE (2011)) (noting that
“judicial results might depend on the order in which cases are considered”).
191. See Lewis A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, The One and the Many: Adjudication in
Collegial Courts, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 11–12 (1993) (applying this legal doctrine); Christian List, The
Probability of Inconsistencies in Complex Collective Decisions, 24 SOC. CHOICE & WELFARE 3, 4–5
(2005) (detailing doctrinal paradox).
192. Hanover 3201 Realty, LLC v. Vill. Supermarkets, Inc., 806 F.3d 162, 189 (3d Cir. 2015)
(Ambro, J., concurring). My thanks to Douglas Baird for drawing this case to my attention.
193. Jonathan Remy Nash, A Context-Sensitive Voting Protocol Paradigm for Multimember
Courts, 56 STAN. L. REV. 75, 84 (2003) (discussing Justice Kennedy’s vote in Arizona v. Fulminante,
499 U.S. 279 (1991)).
194. Stearns, Justiciability, supra note 187, at 1359.
195. Id. at 1362 (“Standing promotes adherence to the majoritarian norm by preventing, at least
presumptively, a non-Cordorcet minority from forcing its preferences into law through the
judiciary . . . .”); see also id. at 1395–96 (asserting that the injury-in-fact rule “properly understood, is
not really about injury at all. Instead, the term ‘injury’ is a metaphor. The relevant inquiry in
comparing these cases is whether the facts alleged are sufficient to overcome the burden of
congressional inertia”). Where the judiciary’s preferences diverge from those of the general public,
however, standing might not have that democracy promoting effect that Stearns envisages. Instead,
standing may prevent Condorcet majorities in the general population from manipulating the order in
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prevents interest groups from engaging in “advertent or ideological path
manipulation.”196 It thus shifts agenda control away from litigants, whose
privilege to enter the courthouse crucially depends on judges’ willingness to
recognize their injury. On this account, standing does not guarantee that a
Condorcet winner (if one exists) will emerge from a sequence of litigated cases
or that the particular order in which issues arise does not influence the final
equilibrium reached by the Court. Nor will it prevent Justices from exploiting
the doctrinal paradox.197
In sum, the institutional responses to Arrovian instability in the judiciary
are a blend of interbranch and precedential tools. Congressional regulation of
lower court jurisdiction—the bounds of which have constantly shifted over
time—determines the range of issues that federal courts can confront from
among the heterogeneous world of potential legal questions. Standing and stare
decisis doctrines, in contrast, might be explained as efforts to prevent certain
forms of strategic action and induce a minimum of stability. Notably, neither
form of agenda control precludes strategic flipping between outcome-based
voting and issue-based voting, strategic decisions to grant or deny certiorari
review,198 or other judicial efforts to shape the law by leveraging agenda
control.
E. Taxonomy of Agenda-Control Instruments in the Constitution
This Section has demonstrated that the Constitution contains a wide array
of agenda-control mechanisms within the separation of powers domain. These
respond not only to capacity constraints and the need to select only a slice of
issues for government intervention but also to the immanent specter of
instability in collective choice mechanisms. Agenda-control instruments in the
Constitution also work in diverse ways, assigning power to a range of actors
both inside and outside the Constitution. In the aggregate, these control
instruments comprise a central element of our Constitution’s design.
The heterogeneity of agenda-control instruments found in the
Constitution, however, should not deflect serious analysis. Despite their

which issues are presented to a Court in order to ensure that the popular median preference, not the
judicial median preference, becomes law.
196. Id. at 1400–01. The Supreme Court’s discretion in respect to whether to grant review via a
petition for certiorari, Stearns notes, is subject to potential manipulation by the Justices, and cannot
prevent the manipulation of jurisprudential paths in the federal appellate courts. Id. at 1350–53.
197. Nash argues that “courts do not adhere to a strict outcome-based voting regime but rather
follow a modified outcome-based voting protocol,” and that this regime, coupled with restraints on
interlocutory appeals, increases the frequency with which the doctrinal paradox can arise. Nash, supra
note 193, at 84–89. As a result, the doctrinal instability can emerge in and across cases.
198. For evidence that the voting on certiorari petitions is informed by strategic, policy-focused
considerations, see Ryan C. Black & Ryan J. Owens, Agenda Setting in the Supreme Court: The
Collision of Policy and Jurisprudence, 71 J. POL. 1062, 1072 (2009) (finding, based on a study of a
random sample of 358 noncapital petitions, that “Justices grant review when they believe that the
policy outcome of the merits decision will be better ideologically for them than is the status quo”).
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diversity, it is possible to organize those diverse institutional design
instruments into a tolerable, simple taxonomical framework—one that should
enable further analysis. The agenda-control instruments described above can be
usefully organized according to three parameters: (1) starting powers versus
concurrence powers; (2) intramural versus external powers; and (3) state versus
nonstate actors. Institutional designers can advance different goals, I suggest,
by toggling between these options. This Section sets forth those different
design choices, as illuminated in the Constitution’s text. It further sets forth
variations within some of those large categories.
The first parameter concerns the timing of an agenda setter’s power,
particularly whether the latter starts a decisional processor or whether it
subsequently concurs with another actor’s decision to set in motion a process.
Starting powers are constitutional endowments to select an issue from the
array of possible objects of government regulation and to initiate policy making
on that topic. The starting powers in the Constitution come in two flavors: they
can be either complete or contingent. A contingent starting power allows the
possessor to offer a proposal that is defeasible in the sense that it is subject to
rejection or amendment by another actor. The House’s origination authority
and the President’s appointment evince this quality. In both these cases, the
starting power does not exhaust the conditions for legal efficacy. Further action
is needed. On the other hand, a complete starting power allows the officeholder
not only to make a proposal, but also to preclude any counterproposals. The
presidential “recognition power” described in Zivotofsky v. Kerry,199 for
example, allows the executive to present the other branches with a fait
accompli with immediate legal and diplomatic consequences.200 Similarly, the
recess appointment power is the complete, if temporally bounded, power to
invest a person with the legal powers and perquisites of a federal office.201 The
Origination Clause would be complete rather than contingent if the House
could make take-it-or-leave-it offers to the Senate, which the Senate could not
in any fashion amend or supplement.
Concurrence powers are conditional on another institution’s power to
initiate state action but comprise necessary steps to the accomplishment of a
legally effective act. At least formally, the constitutional text seems to assign
concurrence powers to the President (who can veto legislation), the Senate
(which can resist treaties), and the judiciary (which must shape the mandate
engrafted into jurisdictional legislation). Concurrence powers might further be
dichotomized as either plenary or partial. A plenary concurrence power allows

199. 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2084–85 (2015).
200. Id. (recognizing “[l]egal consequences,” including the recognized sovereign’s right to sue,
to claim sovereign immunity, act-of-state immunity, and noting that recognition is “a precondition of
regular diplomatic relations”).
201. A recess appointment “shall expire at the end of their next session.” U.S. CONST. art. II, §
2, cl. 3.
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an officeholder not only to stop a proposal, but also to alter it. The Senate’s
role under the Origination Clause has this aspect, as does the Supreme Court’s
discretionary control of its own appellate jurisdiction.202 A concurrence power
is partial insofar as it only permits approval or disapproval of the first mover’s
proposal without substitution of an alternative. The Senate’s role in the
appointments process has this character.
These terms, plenary and partial, are useful heuristics describing end
points of a range, not precise descriptions. To see this, consider how
Congress’s lawmaking power should be characterized. On the one hand,
Congress’s supermajoritarian power to enact laws over a presidential veto
might be seen as an effectively complete power. Where Congress eliminates a
criminal penalty or authorizes private behavior free of civil sanction, in
particular, the executive can do little to resist. On the other hand, when
Congress’s intended policy change depends on executive branch actions,
legislative power looks more partial.
The second important design decision focuses upon the choice between
intramural versus external assignment of agenda control. An intramural
agenda-control power is one that assigns to a single entity the power to select
among potential policy pathways, and also the power to act upon that choice.
For example, the President’s recess appointment power is intramural insofar as
it allows the executive branch to exercise control at a key veto-gate over
regulatory policy.203 Similarly, the newly minted Zivotofsky recognition power
is an intramural instrument of agenda control: it dictates which of several
potential diplomatic stances the United States will adopt toward diverse
international counterparties.204 Standing doctrine may also be seen as a kind of
intramural agenda-control instrument to the extent its contours are not
meaningfully constrained by the Constitution’s precise text. One prominent
account describes standing doctrine as a fabrication of liberal Justices during
the New Deal seeking to insulate regulatory initiatives from judicial
unsettling.205 On this quite plausible view, standing is an invention of the

202. The Court reserves the authority to reframe the questions presented by a given petition,
EUGENE GRESSMAN ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 459–61 (9th ed. 2007), a power that it uses
with increasing frequency, Henry Paul Monaghan, On Avoiding Avoidance, Agenda Control, and
Related Matters, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 665, 689 (2012) (criticizing the practice).
203. It is precisely the ensuing institutional amalgam of agenda control and power to act that
generates suspicion among many commentators. Jonathan Turley, Recess Appointments in the Age of
Regulation, 93 B.U. L. REV. 1523, 1555 (2013) (worrying, in the recess appointment context, that
“concentrated power often results in the loss of liberty”).
204. A weak form of endogenous agenda-control instrument, which falls at the boundary of this
paper’s scope, is each chamber’s power to set its own rules. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2. Those rules
determine who in Congress has power to block proposed legislation, and thus has important outcomerelated consequences.
205. Compare Cass R. Sunstein, Standing and the Privatization of Public Law, 88 COLUM. L.
REV. 1432, 1436–38 (1988) (advancing the thesis of standing as an invention of liberal Justices), with
Daniel E. Ho & Erica L. Ross, Did Liberal Justices Invent the Standing Doctrine? An Empirical Study

2016]

THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF AGENDA CONTROL

1441

federal courts grounded in an ingenuous reading of isolate text fragments from
the Constitution—an autochthonic mechanism for self-regulating the order of
cases presented for judicial resolution to larger ideological ends.
By contrast, an external agenda-control instrument is one that divides
between entities (1) the power to propose or vote on a matter, and (2) the
power to act upon that matter. It is perhaps unsurprising that a constitution that
consciously positions institutional powers to check and balance each other206
would frequently split the power to propose from the power to act. As between
Congress and the Executive, it is the Executive that is empowered to act, but
Congress alone that can propose a policy. Examples of external powers include
the President’s power to nominate Article III judges, the Senate’s decision to
block principal officer appointments, and Congress’s authority to enact
jurisdictional statutes.
The third and final design decision distinguishes between the exercise of
agenda control by a state actor and the exercise of agenda control by a person
plainly outside the state apparatus but operating under a constitutional license.
The lion’s share of examples supplied in Part II, of course, concern allocations
of power within the three federal branches. In describing legislative agenda
control, I identified political parties as central stabilizing forces. To this one
might add the media as an agenda setter, although one more prone to
disequilibrium than stability.207
Table 2 summarizes the preceding taxonomy of agenda-control
instruments found in the Constitution. Examples are provided for each
taxonomical cell for which they are available (with italics used to indicate those
institutional design possibilities that have been struck down by the Court on
constitutional grounds).

of the Evolution of Standing, 1921-2006, 62 STAN. L. REV. 591, 595–97 (2010) (finding that “the
insulation thesis does not fully explain the conception or invention of the modern standing doctrine”).
206. For a canonical statement of this position, see Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 120 (1976)
(per curiam).
207. See supra note 123.
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Table 2: A Taxonomy of Agenda-Control Instruments
State Actors
Intramural

Starting Power






External


President’s recess
appointment power
President’s treaty
powers
Proposing chamber
in voting rule for
veto override
Standing doctrine





Concurrence
Power





President’s veto
Line-item veto

Nonstate Actor




Congress’s
power to enact
bills
Congress’s
control of
federal court
jurisdiction
House’s
Origination
Power
Senate’s role in
fiscal
legislation
Senate’s role in
appointments
and treaties
Legislative veto




Political
parties
Initiative
instruments
in the states

As diverse as the options arrayed on Table 2 are, the variety of agendacontrol rules in the U.S. context hardly exhausts the field. To the contrary, it is
possible to imagine many other agenda-control instruments that do not appear
in this enumeration.
Consider, for example, the mechanism for setting the legislative agenda in
fifth century BC Athens, in the wake of Cleisthenes’s democratic reforms.
Athenian legislative power was partitioned between an Assembly, open to all
who chose to attend on a given day, and a Council of Five Hundred (Council),
whose paid members were chosen by lot and limited to two years of service. 208
The Council had the power to set the Assembly’s agenda, in the sense of
defining the issues under consideration.209 The effect of this system was to split
the power to establish the threshold set of questions under deliberation from
final decisional authority. Moreover, the randomization rule for selecting
Council members, in tandem with term limits, can be understood as a means to
rein in strategic use of the power to set threshold agendas.210
208. JOSIAH OBER, THE ATHENIAN REVOLUTION: ESSAYS ON ANCIENT GREEK DEMOCRACY
AND POLITICAL THEORY 25 (1996).
209. Id.; see also JOSIAH OBER, DEMOCRACY AND KNOWLEDGE: INNOVATION AND LEARNING
IN CLASSICAL ATHENS 142–51 (2008) (describing the geographical roots and structure of the Council,
and noting the effect of term limits on preventing “a self-serving identity or corporate culture”).
210. Once a question had been proposed, the Assembly did not count votes, but instead
employed cheiriotonia (a rough hand count) or even thorubous (acclamation by shouts). Melissa
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Today, “random processes are virtually never found in parliamentary
law,” even though order-mandating rules are in effect “often . . . a randomizing
element.”211 This suggests that there are plausible and tractable design options
that have yet to be explored in the American context.212
This Section has outlined a diversity of agenda-control instruments in
contemporary constitutional law. That diversity can be organized along three
margins. The margins, however, are not exclusive, and experimentation with
novel instruments for clarifying the focus on government action and resolving
instability when government acts might yield more.
III.
THE TRANSFORMATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL AGENDA CONTROL
The Framers’ inclusion of an instrument in the original constitutional text
does not by its own force guarantee that it will persist. This Section revisits the
allocation of agenda control between the three branches to consider how well
the Framers’ constitutional allocation of agenda control has fared in practice. In
brief, the careful distribution of agenda control described in Part II has not
proved to be a stable equilibrium. Starting and concurrence powers have
diffused from their initial settings both across branch boundaries and beyond to
entities outside government. By examining the taxonomy of agenda-control
instruments developed in Part II.E, moreover, a logic of stability and
transformation emerges. Generally speaking, endogenous starting powers
continue to operate as originally specified, whereas external starting powers do
not persist in the same fashion. Concurrence rules, whether endogenous or
external, have persisted to varying degrees. Moreover, starting authority has
migrated away from the House of Representatives and from Congress more
generally toward the Executive. On the other hand, federal courts in general—
and the Supreme Court in particular—have wrested a large measure of starting
authority in relation to the range of issues settled through judicial review on
either constitutional or statutory grounds. While hardly powerless, Congress no
longer occupies the axial agenda-setting position the Framers envisaged.
This Section documents those transmigrations of institutional power. It
also evaluates their consequences. I chart two movements of agenda control:

Schwartzberg, Shouts, Murmurs and Votes: Acclamation and Aggregation in Ancient Greece, 18 J.
POL. PHIL. 448, 464 (2010). Probabilistic modes of aggregation of this kind obscured cycles, likely
making the Council’s agenda control even more significant.
211. Levmore, Parliamentary Law, supra note 84, at 990 n.57. Adam Samaha identifies the
military draft, randomized experiments in welfare policy in the 1960s, and federal land-grant lotteries,
as three recent instances of randomization in government. Adam M. Samaha, Randomization in
Adjudication, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 25–27 (2009). None of these examples concern agendacontrol problems.
212. The role of the European Commission in setting the agenda for Europe-wide lawmaking is
another example. See George Tsebelis, The Power of the European Parliament as a Conditional
Agenda Setter, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 128 (1994).
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the first from Congress to the executive, and the second from Congress to the
federal courts (and the Supreme Court in particular). These transfers of agenda
control are better understood as evidence of salutary institutional adaption in
the teeth of continuing challenges; they should not be seen as infidelities to an
original institutional framework. Although each shift of agenda control has
subtle distributional consequences, none wants for rational justification.
A. The Struggle for Agenda Control Between Congress and the Executive
The trajectory of Congress-executive branch relations can be reframed as
an erosion of the original constitutional allocation of agenda control across
several domains, including regulatory matters, fiscal decisions, and veto
overrides. Judicial efforts to prevent this shift have been erratic and ineffectual
in promoting any coherent vision of legislative process.
1. Congress and the Nation’s Regulatory Agenda
Congress no longer has a monopoly on the nation’s regulatory agenda.
The nondelegation doctrine lies in desuetude both in the courts and practical
political life.213 Its demise is exemplified by administrative agencies’ recent
efforts to deploy old statutes “deliberately and strategically” to address policy
problems that did not exist at the time the statute was initially enacted.214 This
capacity is further aided by courts’ deference to agency expertise as a means
“to soften statutory rigidities or to adapt their terms to unanticipated
conditions.”215 In effect, these practices blunt legislators’ ability to determine
which social problems warrant political attention, and which do not. When an
agency has the option of repurposing a seemingly inapposite statutory authority
to craft a response to a new social or economic problem, Congress will often
not be able to oust that choice because of the presidential veto. Even when a
veto override is available, the agency may well have shifted the status quo upon
which legislators act, altering the play of interest-group activity in ways that
are likely to influence the ultimate outcome of congressional deliberations.
Symptomatic of this erosion of congressional agenda control in the
regulatory sphere is the reflex, increasingly evinced both by courts and
commentators, of justifying exercises of regulatory power as democratic by
dint of the President’s, rather than Congress’s, imprimatur.216 That is,
213. Lawson, supra note 24, at 1237 (stating that the failure of the nondelegation rule faces “no
serious real-world legal or political challenges”).
214. Jody Freeman & David B. Spence, Old Statutes, New Problems, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 19
(2014) (giving as an example the Environmental Protection Agency’s deployment of the Clean Air
Act to address climate change).
215. Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071,
2102–03 (1990).
216. For judicial deployment of a presidential accountability trope in administrative law, see,
for example, Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 483 (2010); Dep’t
of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.R.s, 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1238 (2015) (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).
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independent lawmaking by the executive is now vindicated with a normative
theory of democracy at variance with the theory implied in Article I.
Outside the ordinary regulatory sphere, Congress’s other regulatory
powers have similarly withered on the vine. Consider the powers to make war,
create international obligations, and define crimes. In each domain, Congress
has largely ceded agenda control to the Executive.
First, to near universal obloquy,217 legislators have largely renounced their
power to declare war, while also abjuring the use of fiscal powers to discipline
overseas military adventures.218 Presidential initiation of armed hostilities has
become the rule, with or without a sudden attack, while the Declare War
Clause has fallen into desuetude.219 Symptomatic of this trend, the Declare War
Clause has been invoked only five times in American history.220 Warmaking, in
important ways, is a prerogative of the executive branch.221
Second, in the international domain, it is increasingly common for the
President to enter into so-called executive agreements, lacking any
congressional imprimatur, in lieu of treaties.222 One commentator has observed
that between 1980 and 2000, the United States made 2,744 congressionalexecutive agreements and only 375 treaties.223 The President can also, by
signing a treaty, encumber the United States with international obligations even
if the prospect of Senate ratification is dim.224
Finally, although formally the first mover in the definition of federal
criminal law, in practice, Congress is better viewed as responsive to executive
branch needs. Congress is heavily and asymmetrically lobbied by the
For the leading scholarly treatment, see Kagan, supra note 137, at 2331–32 (arguing that
“[p]residential administration promotes accountability” by “enabling the public to comprehend more
accurately the sources and nature of bureaucratic power” and “establish[ing] an electoral link between
the public and the bureaucracy”).
217. The original, and still the best, critique is JOHN H. ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY:
CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF VIETNAM AND ITS AFTERMATH 47–54 (1993).
218. Ackerman & Hathaway, supra note 145, at 476.
219. This has long been recognized. See Berger, supra note 144, at 58–59.
220. JENNIFER K. ELSEA & RICHARD F. GRIMMETT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., DECLARATIONS
OF WAR AND AUTHORIZATIONS FOR THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND
LEGAL IMPLICATIONS 4 (2011) (listing the War of 1812, the Mexican War of 1846, the SpanishAmerican War of 1898, World War I declared in 1917, and World War II).
221. At the time of this writing, this dynamic was playing out in respect to the conflict against
the Islamic State in Syria. See Manu Raju & Burgess Everett, War Authorization in Trouble on Hill,
POLITICO (Mar. 5, 2015), http://www.politico.com/story/2015/03/no-clear-way-forward-isil-warauthorization-115773.html [https://perma.cc/2GGR-9MHP].
222. LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 217 (2d ed.
1996) (describing such agreements as a “complete alternative” to treaties). Henkin understates the
degree of longstanding resistance of congressional-executive agreements. See, e.g., Edwin Borchard,
Treaties and Executive Agreements—A Reply, 54 YALE L.J. 616, 616 (1945).
223. Oona A. Hathaway, Treaties’ End: The Past, Present, and Future of International
Lawmaking in the United States, 117 YALE L.J. 1236, 1258–60 (2008).
224. David H. Moore, The President’s Unconstitutional Treatymaking, 59 UCLA L. REV. 598,
610–11 (2012) (explaining why, under Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
signature of treaties incurs significant consequences even absent ratification).
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Department of Justice.225 Congress has enacted a network of federal criminal
laws that delegate effectual policymaking authority to prosecutors via “laws
with punishments greater than the facts of the offense would demand,” that
“allow prosecutors to use the excessive punishments as bargaining chips.”226
The perhaps ironic resemblance between the freewheeling days of the federal
common law of crime227 and today’s open-ended statutory delegations of
criminalization only underscores the failure of Congress’s notional starting
power.
Ironically, even as Congress has otherwise ceded regulatory agenda
control, the dykes to legislative action, erected by the concurrence rules of
bicameralism and presentment, have proved remarkably effective at precluding
formal legislative action.228 The high transaction costs of legislative action
render the low transaction costs of executive branch action all the more
alluring.229 This has led presidents to refine their constitutional instruments of
policymaking, such as the Article II appointments power, which effectively
vests presidents with continuing influence over the policy agenda.230
There is some uncertainty about the size of this effect on interbranch
relations.231 A threshold reason for this uncertainty is the historical variance in
senatorial resistance to presidential nominations.232 There is also some
225. Victoria F. Nourse & Jane S. Schacter, The Politics of Legislative Drafting: A
Congressional Case Study, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 587–88 (2002) (describing the Justice Department
as the only “regular player” lobbying congressional staff on criminal justice policy); accord Rachel E.
Barkow, Administering Crime, 52 UCLA L. REV. 715, 728 (2005) (“No other group comes close to
prosecutorial lobbying efforts on crime issues.”).
226. Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons from
Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869, 880 (2009).
227. See supra text accompanying note 147.
228. See supra text accompanying notes 95–101.
229. Freeman & Spence, supra note 214, at 8–17.
230. Nina A. Mendelson, The Uncertain Effects of Senate Confirmation Delays in the Agencies,
64 DUKE L.J. 1571, 1606 (2015) [hereinafter Mendelson, Uncertain Effects] (assuming presidential
incentives to make appointments in order to influence the content of substantive policies); accord Glen
O. Robinson, Independent Agencies: Form and Substance in Executive Prerogative, 1988 DUKE L.J.
238, 250. But see David E. Lewis, The Contemporary Presidency: The Personnel Process in the
Modern Presidency, 42 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 577, 584 (2012) (discussing the administration’s
incentive to “reward campaign personnel, surrogates, and donors with jobs”). Similar considerations
may infuse notionally merit-based civil service hiring to which Article II does not apply. David E.
Lewis & Richard W. Waterman, The Invisible Presidential Appointments: An Examination of
Appointments to the Department of Labor, 2001–11, 43 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 35, 51 (2013)
(presenting evidence of presidential influence on agency staff level—noncareer Senior Executive
Service or what are known as Schedule C appointees); accord Nina A. Mendelson, Agency
Burrowing: Entrenching Policies and Personnel Before a New President Arrives, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV.
557, 610–11 (2003).
231. For an optimistic view of that power’s scope focusing on the Reagan presidency, see Terry
M. Moe, The Politics of Bureaucratic Structure, in CAN THE GOVERNMENT GOVERN? 267, 304 (John
E. Chubb & Paul E. Peterson eds., 1989).
232. Resistance often takes the form of delay. See Nolan McCarty & Rose Razaghian, Advice
and Consent: Senate Responses to Executive Branch Nominations 1885–1996, 43 AM. J. POL. SCI.
1122, 1136–41 (1999) (quantifying delays over time).
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theoretical reason to suspect that the effect of presidential appointive authority
is weaker than might appear at first blush. To be sure, presidents have
unfettered authority to pick candidates to advance to the Senate, and can deploy
their recess appointment power in the teeth of senatorial opposition.233 The
Senate, though, has been increasingly demurring to move appointees forward,
leading to a growing catalog of vacancies.234 That is, just as in other sequential,
multistage decisional processes, the advantage that accrues to the possessor of
exclusive proposal power is cabined when subsequent veto players are willing
to pay the political price of blocking action. Further, recent research identifies a
relatively short tenure of most Senate-confirmed officials, implying that they
are unlikely to initiate or achieve major policy initiatives.235 Additionally, the
number of administrative positions subject to Senate confirmation has seen a
recent “staggering” uptick.236
The net effect of these crosscutting trends on the magnitude of
presidential postenactment control via the appointments power is hard to
quantify. Adding to the complexity of the analysis, any evaluation of ex post
presidential control over regulatory policy would also have to account for
nonconstitutional instruments of regulatory control, such as centralized White
House regulatory review and potentially severe epistemic constraints upon
congressional oversight.237 Nevertheless, it seems safe to venture that the
President’s appointment power—just like bicameralism and the veto—still
operates as a potent downstream instrument for agenda control. The magnitude
of its effect, although uncertain, directly determines the scope of presidential
authority over regulatory agendas. The larger such power, the less important

233. Indeed, Corley finds that presidents are most likely to invoke the recess appointment
power when they face large opposition in the Senate, and when they have a reserve of political capital.
Corley, supra note 158, at 677. Executive branch lawyers, in addition, crafted a “broad construction”
of the recess appointment power as early as the 1840s. Michael J. Gerhardt, Constitutional
Construction and Departmentalism: A Case Study of the Demise of the Whig Presidency, 12 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 425, 441 (2010). This view received judicial blessing only in 2014. NLRB v. Canning, 134
S. Ct. 2550 (2014).
234. Anne Joseph O’Connell, Shortening Agency and Judicial Vacancies Through Filibuster
Reform? An Examination of Confirmation Rates and Delays from 1981 to 2014, 64 DUKE L.J. 1645,
1677 (2015) (documenting recent increases in the duration of vacancies).
235. Mendelson, Uncertain Effects, supra note 230, at 1595–96 (arguing that “political
supervision of significant regulatory activity is mainly reactive, not proactive. Midlevel Senateconfirmed political officials may not be responsible for many significant new affirmative agenda
items”). The mean term of office of a Senate-confirmed official is less than three years. Anne Joseph
O’Connell, Vacant Offices: Delays in Staffing Top Agency Positions, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 913, 919 n.23
(2009).
236. Joel D. Aberbach & Bert A. Rockman, The Appointments Process and the Administrative
Presidency, 39 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 38, 41, 48–49 (2009).
237. For example, congressional efforts to oversee administrative agencies are limited by
legislators’ limited epistemic competence, and the relative expertise of agency officials. See Terry M.
Moe, Political Control and the Power of the Agent, 22 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 1, 3 (2006). If epistemic
constraints are large, an ineffectual appointments power may be somewhat irrelevant.
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the threshold specification of regulatory policy by Congress via the exercise of
bicameralism and presentment is.
2. Congress and the Fiscal Agenda
At first blush, constitutional starting rules are especially significant
allocations of decisional authority between constitutional actors in respect to
fiscal matters. The Origination Clause seems to imply that if the House wishes
to resist the Senate’s initiatives, it can simply refuse to propose a fiscal measure
in the first instance. The power to hold up the legislative process by refusing to
set the ball rolling would seem to imply a disproportionate power on the House
side. Consistent with this view, Adrian Vermeule has argued that the
Origination Clause vests the House with “an intangible but real form of firstmover advantage from its ability to set the policy agenda in ways that structure
both legislative and political debate.”238 The leading empirical study of the
effect of origination clauses in state constitutions suggests that this design
choice produces outcomes closer to the preferences of the median legislator in
the originating chamber (which may or may not be evidence of that chamber’s
influence, as opposed to a stabilizing effect).239
For several reasons, however, it is not clear that the federal Origination
Clause has had, or even could have, the biasing effect in favor of the House
that the Framers anticipated. First, as a matter of theory, it is not the case that
the first option presented to a group of decision makers engaged in serial votes
will be advantaged because of the possibility of strategic voting to defeat a later
proposal.240 An agenda setter might instead seek to leverage the epistemic
effects of timing with a later proposal. Because the timing of a later proposal
allows participants less time to learn about its consequences, opponents of the
measure may have less time to develop counterarguments. The asymmetric
distribution of opportunities for learning, in short, can be used to advantage a
later option.241
A second reason for doubting the efficacy of the Origination Clause turns
on the longstanding practice among rule makers of disfavoring earlier slots in a
decisional process, which tend to be allocated to less popular proposals. One
238. Vermeule, supra note 11, at 424; see id. at 425 (arguing “the House’s ability to demand a
payment for the renunciation of its origination privilege with respect to particular bills will skew the
distribution of political benefits between House and Senate in the House’s favor”). For a formal model
that predicts that bicameral chambers will endogenously sequence themselves to take advantage of
comparative epistemic advantages, see James R. Rogers, Bicameral Sequence: Theory and State
Legislative Evidence, 42 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1025, 1025 (1998).
239. See James R. Rogers, Empirical Determinants of Bicameral Sequence in State
Legislatures, 30 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 29, 39 (2005) [hereinafter Rogers, Empirical Determinants]
(reporting a statistically significant effect in the 40 percent of states that have an origination clause).
240. See Levmore, Bicameralism, supra note 93, at 147. Claims about the House’s agenda
control also fail to account for the now-prevalent Conference Committee process. Id. at 149.
241. Of course, there is also less time to learn of a later proposal’s benefits. But an agenda setter
can prepare to offset this by gathering information before introducing the proposal.
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example is found in the standard rules of legislative procedure. Discussing the
process of filling blanks in legislative schemes,242 Roberts’ Rules of Order
states not only that “members have an opportunity to weigh all choices before
voting” but that entries be arranged such that “the one least likely to be
acceptable will be voted on first.”243 This concern resonates in congressional
practice. Exemplifying the weakness of the House’s power under the
Origination Clause, the Senate has developed a practice of striking the text of a
House bill entirely and then replacing it with a wholly new revenue-raising
text.244 A recent scholarly treatment of the Origination Clause observes that this
maneuver was anticipated amongst the drafters of the Constitution at
Philadelphia.245 In short, from the Constitution’s inception, it may well have
been anticipated that the intercameral distributive effect of the Origination
Clause would be weak to nonexistent.246 To the extent that the voting public
uses the Clause as a guide to facilitate retrospective voting on fiscal matters,
the Clause may well mislead more than it informs.
Finally, empirical evidence that the Origination Clause’s allocation of
starting power has empowered the House is also elusive. Rather, congressional
budgeting reforms enacted in the wake of the early 1970s impoundment
crisis247 have empowered the leadership of the two political parties. The
leaderships exercise effectual agenda control by selecting, and then maintaining
tight control over, the membership of congressional committees responsible for
setting the concurrent budgetary resolution.248

242. For instance, by assigning appropriated amounts to different tasks envisaged by a law.
243. H. ROBERT, ROBERT’S RULES OF ORDER NEWLY REVISED 136–38 (1970) (emphasis
added).
244. Kysar, Shell Bill, supra note 11, at 661 & n.6 (listing examples).
245. Id. at 691.
246. It is not clear whether the finding that state origination clauses lead to outcomes closer to
the median preferences of the proposing chamber are to be the contrary. See Rogers, Empirical
Determinants, supra note 239, at 39. If that finding extends to the federal level—which is doubtful—it
would show the Origination Clause shifts power between appropriation committees in the House and
the median floor voter in the House. That is, absent origination, it would be expected that committees,
which play a gatekeeping role, would have a disproportionate influence on the shape of legislative
proposals. See Elizabeth Garrett, The Purposes of Framework Legislation, 14 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL
ISSUES 717, 758 (2005) (discussing the role of “gatekeeping” appropriations committees on fiscal
matters). With origination, those committees lose power, which is consistent with the intuition that a
starting power is less important than it first seems. See infra Part III.B.
247. See Congressional Budget Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344, § 310(c), 88 Stat. 297, 315
(1974). The preeminent statutory budgetary framework before 1974 directed the President to submit
an annual budget. See 67 Pub. L. No. 13, 42 Stat. 20 (1921); see also Tim Westmoreland, Standard
Errors: How Budget Rules Distort Lawmaking, 95 GEO. L.J. 1555, 1559–64 (2007) (summarizing
history of federal budgeting process).
248. Elizabeth Garrett, The Congressional Budget Process: Strengthening the Party-inGovernment, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 702, 714–16 (2000). Garrett further notes that “negotiations
concerning the concurrent budget resolutions have actually occurred between party leaders outside the
forum of the committees.” Id. at 717.
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3. The Presidential Veto Override
The substantive effects of concurrence rules in the veto override context
are more difficult to discern, in part because of an absence of empirical work
on the topic.249 Unlike the Origination Clause context, the first mover in a veto
override has no framing power: a bill’s contents are identical during final
passage and veto override votes.250 In addition, it is the “rare” case in which a
veto occurs (in 2 percent of cases), and the even scarcer case that Congress
decides to override that veto (about 45 percent after a non-pocket veto).251 As a
result, the embedded starting rule and concurrence requirement within the
constitutional text on veto overrides are unlikely to be anticipated by
participants in the regular enactment process.
At the same time, overrides are no mere formality. They are surprisingly
contested votes, with about one in ten legislators who voted on the final version
of an enrolled bill switching sides either for or against the President.252 Patterns
of vote switching seem to be explained by ideological affinity with (or distance
from) the President as well as a member’s length of service on Capitol Hill.253
Neither of these factors cast light on the effect of the override regime. To the
contrary, both suggest that there is no epistemic justification for the starting
rule, since members already have the information necessary to make a
judgment about ideological affinities and tenure in Congress.254
Nevertheless, the starting rule might be weakly justified as a means of
clarifying political accountability. For those rare cases that Congress rejected
the President’s veto—an action perhaps founded on constitutional objections to
legislation—the Framers may have believed it was important to pick out in the
constitutional text which of the two chambers was to take the lead. Given the
need for both chambers’ consent to an override (i.e., an embedded concurrence
rule) and the possibility that voters are more attentive to the news-engendering

249. David Bridge, Presidential Power Denied: A New Model of Veto Overrides Using
Political Time, 41 CONGRESS & PRESIDENCY 149, 150 (2014) (“[T]he literature is almost silent about
the factors influencing the override of presidential vetoes.”).
250. Patrick T. Hickey, Beyond Pivotal Politics: Constituencies, Electoral Imperatives, and
Veto Override Attempts in the House, 44 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 577, 577 (2014).
251. CAMERON, supra note 87, at 46 (finding that 2.3 percent of bills passed by both chambers
between 1945 and 1992 were vetoed).
252. KREHBIEL, supra note 88, at 123 tbl.6.2 (row 3); see also Hickey, supra note 250, at 581
(finding that 11.3 percent of House members switched votes from final passage to override). To the
best that I can tell, there is no empirical study of veto overrides that distinguishes vote switching in the
first and the second chambers to cast votes.
253. See Hickey, supra note 250, at 591–93 (reporting results from a study of veto overrides
between 1973 and 2011); see also Richard S. Conley & Amie Kreppel, Toward a New Typology of
Vetoes and Overrides, 54 POL. RES. Q. 831, 833 (2001) (analyzing the composition of three different
kinds of override coalitions).
254. For a similar point, see Conley & Kreppel, supra note 253, at 832 (characterizing override
votes as a rare “complete information” environment in Congress).
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second and final vote, this accountability justification is frail in practice.255 If
that is so, the lesson of the veto override provision may be that the Framers
occasionally deployed agenda-control instruments with no clear sense of their
purpose or effects.
4. Judicial Efforts to Buttress Congressional Agenda Control
To the extent that the Supreme Court has resisted these trends, its efforts
have been quixotic and without plainly beneficial effect. The Court has resisted
extratextual supplements to the legislative process in the form of the legislative
veto, the line-item veto, and automatic fiscal adjustments.256 But none of these
additional veto-gates would necessarily compromise the stabilizing function of
Article I, Section 7, nor undermine its status-quo protective effect (to the extent
that is even desirable). Rather, the effect of additional veto-gates would be
merely to change the interbranch distribution of economic and political rents
from the legislative process. Bargaining would continue within the space set by
constitutional veto players, with the ultimate outcome moving to reflect the
different balance of power.
For example, the line-item veto when enacted at the state level generates a
pattern of fiscal outcomes that are somewhat more favorable for the governor’s
party, without changing overall levels of deficit spending.257 Although the
legislative deal reached in specific cases might differ, the domain of possible
legislative outcomes would—social theory predicts—remain constant. The
separation of powers, of course, does not entitle legislative or executive actors
to specific victories or particular outcomes. Indeed, it is likely that judicial
abolitions of the legislative veto, the line-item veto, and the lockbox
mechanism scrambled the distribution of rents from legislative bargaining.
Provided that the range of expected legislative outcomes remains roughly
unchanged,258 it is hard to see why this distributive effect is significant or any
constitutional reason to read Article I, Section 7, as exclusive. The line-item

255. Consider whether, from the perspective of a voter, it could conceivably matter which
chamber votes first in a veto override. The hard question is whether the sequencing of votes could ever
matter to political accountability.
256. See supra text accompanying notes 102–106 (discussing cases).
257. For example, Stearns theorized that the dynamic effect of an item veto would be “simply
to change the players in that process” of bargaining. Maxwell L. Stearns, The Public Choice Case
Against the Item Veto, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 385, 417 (1992). Empirical studies suggest it has no
effect on the size of the budget. See, e.g., Douglas Holtz-Eakin, The Line Item Veto and Public Sector
Budgets: Evidence from the States, 36 J. PUB. ECON. 269 (1988); accord John R. Carter & David
Schap, Line-Item Veto: Where Is Thy Sting?, 4 J. ECON. PERSP. 103 (1990) (noting that a formal model
of line item veto showing de minimus effect).
258. The addition of a new veto point in the form of, say, a legislative veto might narrow the
expected array of potential policies. But its effect may be quite similar to the effect of allowing
legislative committees to serve as gatekeepers in the legislative process. Both the ex ante function of
committees and the ex post operation of legislative vetoes, that is, diminish the domain of enactable
legislative preferences. Why should one be permissible and the other unconstitutional?
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veto, the legislative veto, and the lockbox mechanism are more consistent with
the constitutional design than the Court’s pinched attention to text suggests.259
To a certain extent, the foregoing echoes a familiar story of legislative
decline and executive branch growth. A central difference from standard
accounts, however, is the presence of a new causal mechanism. Explanations
for today’s balance of power between Articles I and II, I have suggested, are
not to be found solely in contemporary institutional and political developments
such as the rise of the regulatory state, the rapid expansion of the national
economy, or America’s post–World War II international hegemony. Instead,
the seeds of the contemporary status quo lie deeper, buried in constitutional
text. The powers lost by Congress and gained by the executive are directly and
intimately linked to the agenda-control instruments woven into the
constitutional fabric at the Philadelphia Convention. Whereas the instruments
assigned to the President have thrived, the instruments meant to empower
Congress have crumbled. If today’s arrangements are to be condemned, in
short, it is as much an inculpation of original constitutional design as of postratification institutional drift.
B. The Struggle for Agenda Control Between Congress and the Court
The constitutional law of agenda control also casts light on the changing
relationship of the federal courts to the political branches, and to Congress in
particular. Recall that Part II identified two forms of agenda control regulating
the issues presented to the judiciary: the congressional titration of federal lower
court and Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction on the one hand, and standing
doctrine’s constraint on litigant manipulation of the order in which legal issues
are presented on the other.260 Neither of these constraints operates today as
initially intended. At the Supreme Court level in particular, Congress has
effectively delegated agenda control to the Justices, while standing doctrine has
proved too malleable to impede interest groups from engaging in strategic
litigation.261 In practice, though, the main beneficiary of doctrinal ductility is
the Court itself, which carves out exceptions for litigants and issues it disfavors
while openly inviting other litigation. The critique of judicial activism leveled
259. There may be other normative justifications for objection to one or all of these measures.
For example, recent work on budgetary allocations suggests that the President, even absent an item
veto, exercises large influence. Valentino Larcinese et al., Allocating the U.S. Federal Budget to the
States: The Impact of the President, 68 J. POL. 447, 447–48 (2006) (examining interstate federal
budgetary expenditures and finding that states that heavily supported the incumbent president in
previous presidential elections tended to receive more funds, while marginal and swing states were not
rewarded).
260. See supra text accompanying notes 188–94.
261. The following account focuses on the relationship between Congress and the Supreme
Court rather than the relationship between Congress and the lower federal courts. Below the apex
tribunal, though, statutory jurisdictional changes often, although not always, follow cues supplied by
the judiciary. See Huq, Judicial Independence, supra note 175, at 18–22 (supplying examples of
jurisdictional change by statute that follows a judicial cue).
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most recently by the dissenting Justices in Obergefell v. Hodges,262 in other
words, can be applied to the Court as a whole. Indeed, because those same
dissenters have rank among the current ideological majority of the Court, they
have greater incentive than their liberal colleagues to use standing rules to
sculpt both their docket and the flow of doctrine from the Court.263 The net
result of these trends is a shift of substantive power from the political branches
to the Court—a power distilled, most importantly, in the Court’s almost
unfettered authority to select which issues to adjudicate.
This shift began with the pathmarking 1891 Evarts Act, which started the
move from mandatory to discretionary appellate jurisdiction and was packaged
in Congress as “a politically neutral performance attempt to relieve the
workload of the Supreme Court.”264 Subsequently, Congress’s approach to the
courts reflected both the influence of the judiciary as a prestigious interest
group265 and also a bipartisan interest in maintaining a tribunal able to resolve
nationally contested disputes of constitutional moment.266 As a result, Congress
has declined (with rare exceptions) to restrict the Court’s reach by deploying
its power to craft exceptions to its appellate jurisdiction notwithstanding its
clear textual power to do so.267 Instead, congressional exercise of its exception
authority has had the effect of furthering the judiciary’s interests of maximizing
discretion and minimizing the burden of unwanted adjudication.268 In short,
Congress has abandoned the effectual exercise of its agenda control. The result
is that the Court has accrued substantially more power to determine which
issues it addresses. The judicial agenda, once exogenous, is now an endogenous
function of the bench’s preferences.

262. 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2640 (Alito, J., dissenting); see also id. at 2629 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(accusing the Obergefell majority of staking “a naked judicial claim to legislative—indeed, superlegislative—power; a claim fundamentally at odds with our system of government”).
263. To be clear, there is no particular reason to believe that a majority of liberal Justices would
refrain from the same manipulation of the judicial agenda were they in authority.
264. CROWE, supra note 179, at 184–87 (noting that certiorari had “previously [been] used
sparingly and only to summon the record of a case”). The Judicial Code of 1911, which abolished
circuit riding similarly “sparked only token resistance from . . . legislators.” Id. at 188.
265. Id. at 201–09.
266. Tara Leigh Grove, The Exceptions Clause as a Structural Safeguard, 113 COLUM. L. REV.
929, 945–46 (2013) (noting how both conservatives and liberals “were willing to support measures
that protected the Supreme Court’s settlement function”). This is a specific example of the more
general tendency of elected actors to support judicial power as a delegation of power to resolve
difficult national problems. See Keith E. Whittington, “Interpose Your Friendly Hand”: Political
Supports for the Exercise of Judicial Review by the United States Supreme Court, 99 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 583, 584 (2005).
267. See Fallon, supra note 180, at 1045 (“Although jurisdiction-stripping bills are frequently
introduced in Congress, they seldom pass.”). The exception is the limitation on habeas corpus review
invalidated in Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008) (extending constitutional habeas jurisdiction
to Guantánamo Bay detentions).
268. Grove, supra note 266, at 931 (“Congress has made ‘exceptions’ and ‘regulations’ that
facilitate the Court’s role in providing a definitive and uniform resolution of federal questions.”).

1454

CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 104:1401

Equally, Stearns’ aspirations for standing doctrine have been undermined
by the incoherence of the injury-in-fact rule and the broader willingness of
Justices to use the standing doctrine to select litigants and to employ their
platform at the Court to invite review of issues that might otherwise never
reach the Court. Standing law is commonly condemned as “lawless, illogical,
and dishonest.”269 The injury-in-fact requirement, in particular, conduces to
“open-ended, free-form, and near metaphysical inquiries into the adequacy of
alleged injuries.”270 Stearns argues that absent the constraint imposed by
standing doctrine, “the Court’s nominal power of docket control would be
largely illusory” because litigants could manufacture circuit splits that the
Court would feel compelled to adjudicate.271
Stearns’s prediction, for worse rather than for better, has not been borne
out in practice. Only a “small proportion of the nation’s agenda . . . comes
directly before the Supreme Court in particular and the courts in general.”272
There is little evidence that the Court is pressed against its collective will into
addressing some issues and not others by conniving with interest groups. To
the contrary, the Court has retained a large measure of agenda control for two
reasons. First, the very fluidity of standing doctrine empowers the Justices to
carve out favored and disfavored classes of litigants (and hence, legal issues) in
ways that reassert judicial primacy. Both liberal and conservative Justices have
deployed standing doctrine to close the courthouse door to disfavored litigants
in hotly contested domains like Establishment Clause jurisprudence.273
Depending on their prior beliefs, the Justices are also more or less rigorous
when applying the presumption against facial challenges, especially in
structural constitutional cases, and also in looking for traditional indicia of
harm necessary for Article III standing.274 And when litigants prove too reticent
to press an issue that interests the Justices, the Justices unheedingly introduce it
themselves. The core constitutional question in Zivotofsky, for example, was of
sufficient interest to the Justices that they added it after a first-round certiorari
petition.275
269. Heather Elliott, The Functions of Standing, 61 STAN. L. REV. 459, 501 (2008).
270. Aziz Z. Huq, Standing for the Structural Constitution, 99 VA. L. REV. 1435, 1460 (2013)
[hereinafter Huq, Standing]; accord Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits,
“Injuries,” and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 167 (1992).
271. Stearns, Historical Evidence, supra note 187, at 329.
272. Frederick Schauer, Foreword: The Court’s Agenda—and the Nation’s, 120 HARV. L. REV.
4, 9 (2006).
273. For conservative and liberal uses of standing doctrine to disfavor litigants in the
Establishment Clause context, see respectively Hein v. Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc., 551
U.S. 587, 593 (2007) (rejecting taxpayer standing for executive actions that arguably violate the
Establishment Clause), and Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 17 (2004)
(rejecting third-party standing for public school policy that arguably violates the Establishment
Clause).
274. Huq, Standing, supra note 270, at 1443–48 (collecting cases).
275. M.B.Z. ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 131 S. Ct. 2897 (2011) (order granting certiorari, but
directing the parties to answer the additional question of “[w]hether Section 214 of the Foreign
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Second, the Justices have become increasingly willing and able to use
their opinions as platforms to signal to potential litigants which legal issues
they should present to courts. For example, in the 2014 Term, Justice Thomas
issued a series of striking opinions in which he invited litigants to challenge
basic tenets of the regulatory state on originalist grounds.276 None of these
concurrences were strictly necessary to the resolution of a case at hand, even on
Justice Thomas’s own logic. Each concurrence comprised dicta plainly aimed
at influencing the behavior of future litigants. On the other side of the
ideological spectrum, Justice Breyer exploited an Eighth Amendment challenge
to a specific method of execution to invite reconsideration of the death
penalty.277 Both liberal and conservative Justices, moreover, have also been
willing to exploit opinions dissenting from the denial of a certiorari petition as
a means to signal their interest in future litigation.278 By signaling issues of
potential interest, teasing flexibility from justiciability doctrine, and adding
issues to certiorari petitions as necessary, the Justices obtain a large measure of
discretion over the contents of their appellate docket, amplifying the
endogenous agenda control vested by statute from 1891 onwards.
In his dissent in Obergefell v. Hodges, Chief Justice Roberts bemoaned
the majority’s willingness to “seiz[e] for itself a question the Constitution
leaves to the people, at a time when the people are engaged in a vibrant debate
on that question.”279 It is no great feat to parry Chief Justice Roberts with a tu
quoque.280 But trading allegations of judicial overreach hardly edifies: the more
important point is that the power to pluck issues from the public agenda is
deeply woven into the current constitutional matrix for judicial power. It is the
shift from exogenous to endogenous agenda control that lies behind the Court’s
extraordinary rise in prestige and national prominence—a shift that liberals and
conservatives alike have exploited and decried in almost equal measure.
Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003, impermissibly infringes the President’s power to
recognize foreign sovereigns”). For another example of wholesale change by the Court of the issue
presented, see Citizens United v. FEC, 557 U.S. 932 (2009) (mem.).
276. See Oneok, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1591, 1603 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment) (noting “doubts about the legitimacy of this Court’s precedents
concerning the pre-emptive scope of the Natural Gas Act,” and in effect flagging the issue for future
challenge); Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.R.s, 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1240–41 (2015) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (calling into question the permissible scope of legislative guidance and
purporting to “identify principles relevant to today’s dispute, with an eye to offering guidance to the
lower courts on remand”); Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1213 (2015) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (calling into question “the legitimacy of our precedents requiring
deference to administrative interpretations of regulations,” including Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand
Co., 325 U.S. 410 (1945)).
277. Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2755 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“I would ask for
full briefing on a more basic question: whether the death penalty violates the Constitution.”).
278. Rapelje v. Blackston, 136 S. Ct. 388 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari); Delling v. Idaho, 133 S. Ct. 504 (2012) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
279. 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2612 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
280. See, e.g., Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013) (invalidating the coverage
formula of the Voting Rights Act as amended in 2008).
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C. Evaluating the Transformation of Constitutional Agenda Control
The standard story of how federal governance changed across the
twentieth century focuses on the erosion of limits on congressional authority, to
the detriment of both the states and individuals’ interests,281 and the accretion
of power by the executive branch.282 It thus seeks to explain institutional
change as a process of unraveling boundaries on institutional power.
My central aim in this Section has been to identify the constitutional law
of agenda control as an important yet underappreciated site of constitutional
conflict and institutional transformation over time. To be sure, this alternative
account has continuities with the standard story of how the federal government
has changed over time. The demise of the nondelegation doctrine, for example,
continues to play a central role in both explanations of shifting configurations
of government power.283 Nevertheless, I suggest that the constitutional law of
agenda control has been an analytically distinct site of change to the
interbranch balance of power across the twentieth century. To understand the
increasingly robust authority of the executive and the judiciary, as well as the
impoverishment of the legislature, it is necessary to account for the legal
assignment of agenda control as well as changing institutional capacities and
positive lawmaking powers. Standard accounts that focus on bureaucratic
personnel or on external legal constraints alone, by contrast, fail to tell the
whole story.
The role that shifting agenda control has played in constitutional history
further raises a normative question: What should we make of this erosion of a
seemingly central element of constitutional design? And while it seems highly
unlikely that courts could undo the institutional changes described in this
Section—doing so, after all, would unwind much of their own power to
identify and resolve constitutional issues—should courts invalidate new
changes to the division of agenda control between the branches? Should judges
inveigh other institutional actors for their failure to follow the original
constitutional dispensation?

281. A leading statement of this view is Douglas H. Ginsburg, Delegation Running Riot, 18
REG. 84, 84 (1995). For reiterations from different parts of the political spectrum, see, for example,
Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 HARV. L. REV. 799, 857 n.255
(1995) (“[Wickard] construed Congress’s commerce powers as virtually unlimited . . . .”); Randy E.
Barnett, Commandeering the People: Why the Individual Health Insurance Mandate Is
Unconstitutional, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 581, 637 (2010) (decrying the possibility of limitless
congressional regulatory power).
282. Tom C.W. Lin, CEOs and Presidents, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1351, 1375 (2014) (noting
how “the President’s powers have . . . expanded dramatically” with rise of the regulatory state);
William P. Marshall, Eleven Reasons Why Presidential Power Inevitably Expands and Why It Matters,
88 B.U. L. REV. 505, 514 (2008) (same).
283. See, e.g., Lawson, supra note 24, at 1243 (decrying the decline of the nondelegation
doctrine); Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 VA. L. REV. 327, 329 (2002) (noting
that the Court summarized “more than half a century of case law by unanimously declaring the
nondelegation doctrine to be effectively a dead letter”).
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In part, the answers to these questions are obviously contingent on large,
unresolved questions of constitutional theory. Originalists, for example, will
offer different analyses from more consequentialist scholars. Without offering a
complete theory of constitutional interpretation, some tentative normative
conclusions can be offered here.
The constitutional law of agenda control is part of what I have elsewhere
called the negotiated structural constitution.284 The institutional balance of
power over agenda control shifted in part because the Framers’ selection of
agenda-control instruments was not always successful: some of their design
choices misfired, while others succeeded rather too well. As a result, branches
vested with an agenda-control instrument that they could not effectively deploy
found it beneficial to assign that power to a coordinate branch. Generally, this
involved Congress legislating away its power of agenda control to either the
executive or judiciary branch. At the same time, branches capable of
effectively wielding agenda control have wielded it to the exclusion of other
branches. Institutional success in the use of some powers, in other words,
engenders confidence to make broader claims to competence, which in turn are
accepted or even ratified by other branches.
On a very superficial glance, this comprises a simple story of
constitutional failure. The original primacy of Congress has collapsed. Its
rectification would entail massive transfers of authority between the branches
to recreate the primordial institutional status quo. Consistent with this view,
Justice Thomas has recently proposed several radical changes to the law,
including a reinvigorated nondelegation doctrine, a limit to agency
adjudication, and a rollback of judicial deference to agencies’ constructions of
both statutes and their own regulations.285
Although Justice Thomas’s arguments, and the originalist account that
underpins them, have obvious continuing appeal to many, they are not the only
way to gloss changes to the constitutional law of agenda control. In earlier
work, I have argued that the Constitution need not be read to assign immutable
obligations to specific institutions.286 Rather, the Constitution provisionally
assigns regulatory entitlements to different branches as a threshold matter. Just
like individuals, each branch can waive or transfer its exercise of an
institutional interest either because it receives something of benefit in return or
because it perceives the other branch as better suited to carrying out a given
function. In military and foreign affairs matters, for example, Congress has
ceded turf to the executive in part because it benefits by avoiding hard foreign
policy decisions, and in part because it views the executive branch as better

284. Huq, Negotiated Structural Constitution, supra note 23, at 1568.
285. For citations to the relevant cases, see supra note 10. See also Brian Lipshutz, Justice
Thomas and the Originalist Turn in Administrative Law, 125 YALE L.J. F. 94, 95 (2015) (describing
these opinions as a “sustained originalist critique of administrative law”).
286. See Huq, Negotiated Structural Constitution, supra note 23, at 1620–23.
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positioned to make such decisions.287 The recognition of such negotiated
interbranch arrangements are, I have argued, generally consistent with the
Constitution’s ambition of effective, welfare-enhancing governance. It is also
likely to be generally superior to any dispensation a court would reach through
standard constitutional interpretation. And it is consonant with the growing
recognition that an important element of our constitutional law comprises the
“glosses” that institutional actors offer on the document’s text through their
own efforts to deploy the Constitution as a working tool of government under
fluctuating social and political circumstances.288 To recognize the products of
institutional negotiation over agenda control is not merely an act of
realpolitik—a concession of the judiciary’s necessary frailty in the teeth of
determined political opposition—but a Burkean recognition of the accumulated
wisdom of many generations of Americans’ largely good-faith efforts to
implement the Constitution.
Accordingly, such bargained-for restructuring of institutional parameters
should be seen as generally desirable evidence of a constitutional order that is
adapting and evolving to fulfill the Framers’ larger ambition of sound
governance. The collapse of constitutional agenda-control instruments that is
analyzed in this Section fits neatly within this account of a negotiated structural
constitution. By and large, agenda control has shifted to the institution most
capable and willing to wield it. At the same time, Congress has retained a
plethora of budgetary, regulatory, and rhetorical tools—as well as its powerful
ability to block changes to the status quo—that ensures can play a role when it
sees fit to do so. As a result, the constitutional values of democratic
accountability, efficient government, and liberty promotion do not seem
obviously offended by the constitutional law of agenda control that I have
described.
Instead, it is important to recognize, the main effect of constitutional
agenda control’s erosion is distributive. Rulemaking, whether through
legislation, administrative regulation, or judicial precedent, creates winners and
losers. Changing the allocation of agenda control likely results in a different
outcome, and hence a different pattern of gains and losses in a given case. But
it is not clear that the fact that a shift in agenda control influences who loses
and who wins in regulatory battles should have constitutional salience. To be
sure, the House’s loss of control over the budget, the President’s greater power
to initiate regulatory initiatives, and the Court’s power to set the constitutional
adjudication agenda all mean that the interest groups that prevail in the political
process in a given case are not those that would prevail under a pinched
reading of the Constitution’s text. But a change in winners and losers in a
single case is not of clear constitutional salience. Over the long term, the flow
287. Id. at 1624–65 (discussing foreign affairs context).
288. See Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of
Powers, 126 HARV. L. REV. 411, 417–24 (2012).
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of benefits and burdens from the modified constitutional dispensation is hardly
predictable. Further, it is not plainly distinct from the long-term distributive
patterns generated by rejecting changes to the constitutional law of agenda
control.
To see this more clearly, consider a recent proposal to construe Article II
to allow presidents to make agency appointments when the Senate fails to act
on his proposed candidates.289 In effect, this moves the influence over
regulatory agendas currently embodied in the appointments process wholly
over to the presidency. Such a change to the law would “alter the bargaining
game between the President and the Senate,” in the sense that the size and
composition of the successful nomination pool would change.290 The
distribution of regulatory winners and losers would likely change accordingly.
Yet it is quite plausible to think that the change would have no negative
systemic effects on good governance, but would instead eliminate the
nonconstitutional power of Senate minority factions to extract exorbitant
political rents.291 These factions would lose out, but they might well adapt by
striving harder to obtain the presidency for their party. Or they might turn to
the courts. In the long term, the distributive effects of changing the
constitutional law of agenda control are thus uncertain. Factions and interest
groups adapt. With electoral cycle, congressional losers become White House
winners. The systemic effects of this single shift in agenda control in contrast
are largely positive or neutral, even if the distributional effects in given
instances vary considerably.
The same analysis can be extended, mutatis mutandi, more generally to
historical changes in the constitutional law of agenda control. The large shift of
budgetary authority away from the House and from the legislature likely has
yielded quite different patterns of fiscal winners and losers in discrete cases.
But that alone does not make it suspect. A more robust account of the
President’s recess appointment power means regulatory missions endorsed by a
historical Congress but disfavored by a contemporary Congress are more likely
to advance. But it is not clear that there is any constitutional reason for concern
as a result. The movement of war and foreign affairs powers away from
Congress also results in a different array of overseas entanglements. Whether
that difference is constitutionally salient is hard to say: Consequentialist
analysis likely turns entirely on one’s views about the merits of specific
deployments and international agreements. The Supreme Court’s functional
hegemony over the path of constitutional adjudication has doubtless altered the

289. See Matthew C. Stephenson, Can the President Appoint Principal Executive Officers
Without a Senate Confirmation Vote?, 122 YALE L.J. 940, 942 (2013) (arguing that “the Constitution
can and should be read to construe Senate inaction on a nominee as implied consent to the
appointment, at least under some circumstances”).
290. Id. at 946–47.
291. Id. at 948–49.
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mix of disputes and resulting precedent in comparison to a status quo of greater
departmentalism. Again, it is hardly plain that this movement can be
characterized as positive or negative without an implicit theory of
constitutional interpretation, and a judgment of whether the Court or the
political branches has gotten more questions correct.
One worry, nevertheless, is worth identifying. A potential normative
concern raised by the changes mapped in this Section turns on the gradual
disempowerment of Congress, which has increasingly lost control of the
national policy agenda over time.292 At the same time, there has been a shift of
discretionary policy-making authority to both the executive and the federal
courts.293 On this view, the accumulated weight of changes to the constitutional
law of agenda control rises to the level of constitutional concern because of the
imbalance that has ensued between the branches. Even if individual changes to
agenda control, therefore, were negotiated, their net effect has been an
unhealthy emasculation of what the Framers anticipated would be the most
dangerous branch. On this view, for example, the Court’s broad construction of
the recess appointment power in NLRB v. Canning is problematic.294 Justice
Breyer’s majority opinion rested narrowly on a reading of the “Clause’s
purpose [that] demands the broader interpretation,”295 one that emphasized the
risk of vacancies in senior agency positions.296 This “functionalist” argument,
however, does not account for overall trends in the constitutional law of agenda
control. It arguably risks further tilting an interbranch relationship that is
already comprehensively asymmetrical.
A determination of whether Congress has lost “too much” power
implicates hard questions of democratic and constitutional theory. It is far from
clear, to my mind, that the contemporary worry about constitutional imbalance
disfavoring Congress is wholly justified. To begin with, the asymmetry
between the executive and Congress might depend primarily on the sheer size
of the regulatory and military state at the President’s putative command, and on
the marked difference in the relative institution costs of institutional action.
Law in general, and the constitutional law of agenda control in particular,
might have only an inframarginal effect on these costs, and the growth of the
federal regulatory state has obvious offsetting advantages. Even if law’s effect
is significant, moreover, the notion of a balance between the branches rests on

292. In an earlier work, I thus raised the possibility of “paternalism for institutional interests,”
given “collective pathologies that impede rational pursuit of recognized self-interest.” Huq, Negotiated
Structural Constitution, supra note 23, at 1669.
293. See, e.g., Lin, supra note 282, at 1375 (2014) (noting how “the President’s powers
have . . . expanded dramatically” with rise of the regulatory state); William P. Marshall, Eleven
Reasons Why Presidential Power Inevitably Expands and Why It Matters, 88 B.U. L. REV. 505, 514
(2008) (same).
294. 134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014).
295. Id. at 2561.
296. Id. at 2564–65.
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notoriously fragile intellectual premises.297 Further, as a host of empirical
studies show, the policy effects of separated powers are ambiguous, even at the
level of cross-national studies.298 Even discounting the local observation that
Congress does not seem incapable of throwing its weight around,299 compelling
reasons exist for thinking that loud alarms about constitutional imbalance are
not yet warranted. Instead, complaints of imbalance await a convincing
theoretical and empirical underpinning to render them plausible grounds for
complaint about the shifting terrain of agenda control.
CONCLUSION
This Article has developed a novel vocabulary for the analysis of
constitutional problems. It has demonstrated that divergent forms of agenda
control are embedded in the Constitution’s text and the Court’s jurisprudence.
Focusing on the separation of powers, I have aimed to demonstrate that agenda
control measures can have the effect of partitioning, dispersing, or
concentrating state power. Future analyses of the Constitution’s function and
consequences, to say nothing of historical constitutional change, should
account for the law of agenda control and the way it has channeled, enabled,
and blocked exercises of state power above in ways that standard accounts fail
to capture.

297. See M. Elizabeth Magill, The Real Separation in Separation of Powers Law, 86 VA. L.
REV. 1127, 1155–57 (2000) (arguing that ideas of balance or separation provide no determinate
answer to institutional design questions).
298. For a summary of this research, see Aziz Z. Huq, Libertarian Separation of Powers, 8
N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 1006 (2014).
299. See, e.g., Jennifer Steinhauer, Republican Freedom Caucus’s Revolt in House Is Stoked
Back Home, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 19, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/20/us/politics/republicanfreedom-caucuss-revolt-in-house-is-stoked-back-home.html [https://perma.cc/9LT9-QQGG].
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